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ABSTRACT 
The ANC ascended to government against the backdrop of a rapidly changing global political 
economic order after the end of the Cold War. This effectively marked the collapse of 
communism as a global political force and the concomitant dominance of neoliberalism. In 
1996, the African National Congress government adopted the Growth Employment and 
Redistribution strategy (GEAR) as its new economic blue print, through which it would 
pursue its transformation agenda. In so doing, the ANC circumvented economic policy 
consultation processes with its political alliance partners and declared GEAR ‘non-
negotiable’. 
This research argues that the shift to GEAR was essentially an economic policy alignment 
with the dominant post -Cold War neoliberal discourse and practice. It was fashioned 
deliberately by key ANC policy makers who had bought into the neoliberal assumption that 
development would occur after economic growth had been attained. The GEAR strategy 
privileged market led reforms which subordinated the transformation agenda to orthodox 
macroeconomic considerations. The pro-market bias which began with the adoption of the 
GEAR strategy has continued to shape South Africa’s post-apartheid economic policy 
environment to a significant extent.  
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CHAPTER ONE: 
INTRODUCTION:  
At the centre of the African National Congress’ (ANC) liberation narrative has been the 
articulation of a transformation vision for South Africa. This transformation vision was 
brought about by the recognition that centuries of colonial and subsequent decades of 
Apartheid exploitation had left the majority of South African citizens disenfranchised and 
systematically excluded from meaningful participation in South Africa’s political and 
economic life.  Of utmost importance for the ANC and its allies in the South African 
Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), was 
articulating the character and/or nature that this transformation of South Africa would 
assume in general and in particular crafting an economic vision and strategy as a means to 
achieve this transformation.  
In 1994 the newly elected ANC government set out to craft an economic policy for South 
Africa which was based on the principles enshrined in the Freedom Charter which 
emphasised collective economic ownership and the centrality of the state in the pursuit of 
transformation. This was followed by the introduction of the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP) base document as a vehicle to realise this Freedom Charter 
vision.  In the process of crafting the RDP, the ANC undertook a wide consultation process 
with its alliance partners and the public at large. To this end Nelson Mandela stated that “in 
1955, we actively involved people and their organisations, in articulating their needs and 
aspirations; once again we have consulted widely”.1  What is significant about this broad 
consultation is that it underscored the value that the ANC placed on the principle of 
inclusivity when it came to the crafting of policy in general and economic policy in particular.  
At the centre of the RDP was the notion that economic growth would be pursued alongside 
addressing the basic needs of the people; and that this would also be an undertaking to be 
predominantly led by the state.2 
Against the backdrop of the Freedom Charter and subsequently the RDP, the ANC’s 
economic vision can be understood as primarily developmental in nature, underscoring the 
centrality of addressing the basic needs of the people as an economic priority. At its 50th 
National Congress, the ANC reiterated this stance when it declared that  
“Economics is about people, their work, their ownership of productive assets or lack 
of it, their share of what they produce what they buy and sell, their accommodation, 
                                                          
1
 Reconstruction and Development Programme: A policy Framework, accessed March 12, 2014, 
www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=235 
2
Thembinkosi L. Lehloesa, “South Africa’s Growth Economic And Redistribution Strategy, in the context of 
Structural Adjustments in the South”, (MA thesis, Rhodes University, January 2000)  
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their recreation, in fact every element which we describe as quality of life, flows 
from the structure and management of the economy”3.  
This also demonstrated the centrality of the economy as a means towards attaining the 
ANC’s transformation vision.  
The ANC’s ascendance to government coincided with significant global developments and 
most notably the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s. This period signalled particular 
shifts in global economic thinking and practice, as it followed a global crisis of accumulation 
of the 1970s. In the 1970s the prominent North Atlantic capitalist economies were afflicted 
by a phenomenon known as ‘stagflation’4, which the Keynesian system which they had 
hitherto relied upon had not anticipated.   Stagflation resulted in slower growth rates, high 
inflation and recession.5 This led to the collapse of the earlier Bretton Woods system which 
was responsible for the ‘golden age of social democratic capitalism,’ thus bringing about the 
rise and ultimate dominance of Neoliberalism.6  
Against the backdrop of the global crisis of capital accumulation, key elite historical figures 
rose to prominence, advocating for market led economic reforms as a response to the 
global capital accumulation crisis. The rationale behind this was to promote ideas which 
emphasised the efficiency of market competition, the role of individuals in determining 
economic outcomes and distortions accruing from government intervention and the 
regulation of markets.7 The rise in these ideas was buttressed by the Reagan administration 
in America and the Thatcher administration in the United Kingdom. It was under the 
leadership of these two political protagonists-but not limited to it- that the global 
dominance of neoliberal discourse and practice which accorded primacy to market led 
reforms, was set in motion. 
South Africa’s transition from apartheid to democratic governance attracted significant 
amounts of global interest ranging from international big business, domestic business, 
scholars and international policy makers from the IMF and World Bank. This meant that the 
ANC’s developmental economic vision for the pursuit of its transformation aims would 
prove to be an essentially contested terrain. Notwithstanding the absence of a coherent 
economic policy when the ANC approached the negotiation table at the Convention for a 
                                                          
3
 Resolutions; 5Oth National Conference: Resolutions- Economic Transformation, accessed March, 12, 2014, 
http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=2435. 
4
 K.S Jomo, “Economic Reform for Whom? Beyond the Washington Consensus” 2005, accessed March, 12, 
2014, http://www.paecon.net/PAEReview/issue35/Jomo35.htm 
5
 Ian Van Vuuren, “Varieties of Neoliberalism within the post -cold war period: Economic Policy in Post-
Apartheid South Africa”, (MA Thesis, University of Stellenbosch, 2013).   
6
 Sampie Terreblanche, “Lost in Transformation: South Africa’s search for a new future since 1986”, (KMM 
Review Publishing Company (PTY) Ltd), 2012, 17-36   
7
 Thomas I Palley, “From Keynesianism to Neoliberlaism: Shifting paradigms in Economics”, Alfredo Saad-Filho 
and Deborah Johnston, Neoliberalism a Critical Reader, (Pluto Press, 2004), 20. 
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Democratic South Africa (CODESA),8 economic thinking in the ANC was premised on the 
principals enshrined in the Freedom Charter later enunciated in the RDP when the ANC was 
elected into government. At the party level the ANC’s first attempt to articulate its 
economic vision in policy terms, was made manifest in the 1990 ‘Discussion Document on 
Economic Policy’ (DEP), which emphasised a fundamental restructuring of the economy 
through following a redistributive logic premised on prioritising the satisfaction of people’s 
basic needs. In this case the full economic inclusion of the country’s majority would be 
promoted through a redistributive political-economy regime. 
To this end, scholars like Hein Marais argued that  
“The overriding theme was ‘growth through redistribution’, a formula in which 
redistribution acts as a spur to growth and in which the fruits of growth are 
redistributed to satisfy basic needs. The logic was that growth could be spurred by 
satisfying the basic needs of the majority through a redistribution of income which 
would increase employment, demand and production”.9   
Marais further noted that;  
“The document envisaged an active role for the state in planning industrial strategy 
and overcoming racial, gender and geographic inequalities. It stressed the need to 
restructure the financial sector which, it said ‘does not sufficiently direct savings into 
productive activity or into critical areas of infrastructural development’ and, instead, 
encourages a scramble for short-term speculative profit”.10 
The ANC’s economic vision was met with a fair amount of resistance. Economists like Niccoli 
Nattrass contended that the growth through redistribution proposition was merely an 
attempt at political expediency because “it served the political purpose of uniting various 
constituencies within the ANC”. 11   Attacks emanating from mainstream media and 
influential business quarters, pointed out that the ANC’s economic proposal bore socialist 
undertones and was nothing short of macroeconomic populism.  
Others argued that, “a state spending spree (geared at redistribution) would overheat the 
economy, and bog it down in a morass of foreign exchange shortages, currency 
devaluations, rampant inflation, severe indebtedness and cuts in real wages”.12 The ANC’s 
economic vision began to wither under the weight of criticism from various domestic and 
international business quarters as well as mainstream media commentary. Soon the ANC 
shifted in favour of an economic vision which differed markedly from what was articulated 
                                                          
8
 Hein Marais, “South Africa –Limits to Change: The evolution of economic policy A short walk to Orthodoxy”, 
(UCT Press 2001). 
9
 Marais, South Africa-Limits to Change, 148. 
10
 Marais, South Africa-Limits to Change, 148. 
11
 Niccoli Nattrass, quoted in, Hein Marais, “South Africa –Limits to Change: The evolution of economic policy A 
short walk to Orthodoxy”, (UCT Press 2001), 148. 
12
 Marais, South Africa-Limits to Change, 149 
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in the Freedom charter and later the RDP base document, thus aligning its economic 
thinking with the hegemonic global current of neoliberal economic thought and practice.  
In June 1996 the Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) macro-economic strategy 
was unilaterally unveiled by the ANC led government.  This framework had been developed 
with the close assistance of a group of IMF and World Bank experts, having bypassed the 
alliance consultative process. Then Finance Minister Trevor Manuel declared GEAR ‘non-
negotiable’. GEAR proposed to create a competitive fast growing economy, with its 
architects arguing that a growth rate of 3%, the rate at which South Africa was growing, was 
unsustainable. Further, GEAR proposed interventions which would seek to: stimulate 
economic growth by keeping the fiscal deficit at an acceptable low level; keep inflation in 
check as it were; creating significant levels of employment; increase public spending yet 
decreasing public consumption expenditure; create a sound balance of payments, provide 
exchange rate stability as well as an expansionary fiscal strategy.13 These proposals thus 
informed the monetary and fiscal policy agenda employed by GEAR.    
Such a set of interventions represented a significant involvement of private enterprise or 
market involvement in rebuilding and reconstructing the South African economy. Private 
sector investment became much sought after which led to concerted efforts in courting 
foreign direct investment (FDI). In this regard GEAR stipulated that “Trade and industrial 
policies aim to promote an outward-oriented industrial economy, integrated into the 
regional and global environment and fully responsive to market trends and opportunities”.14 
Whilst these were also much needed interventions, the thinking which promoted the 
understanding that South Africa’s transformation would occur primarily through a state led 
developmental economic prism which prioritised the well-being of people and emphasised 
redistribution of the country’s wealth was dispensed with. 
  
                                                          
13
 Marais, South Africa-Limits to change, 160-167 
14
 Growth Employment and Redistribution: A Macroeconomic Strategy, accessed March 12, 2014, 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/publications/other/gear/chapters.pdf, 7   
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RESEARCH QUESTIONS:  
The African National Congress became the first popularly elected democratic government of 
South Africa, managing to secure 62.5% of the vote in the 1994 elections.15 In its election 
campaign the ANC prioritised economic policies which sought to address the basic needs of 
the people. This would occur through a state led redistributive programme which would 
lead to growth.16 This vision was derived from the principles of the Freedom Charter which 
placed at their core, developmental values which envisioned that all citizens would be 
equitable owners of the country’s wealth. To this end the Freedom Charter stated that, “the 
national wealth of our country, the heritage of South Africans, shall be restored to the 
people; the mineral wealth beneath the soil, the Banks and monopoly industry shall be 
transferred to the ownership of the people as a whole…”.17 After two years in government 
the ANC deviated from this vision and embraced economic policies which ostensibly 
contradicted its historical economic vision and pronouncements.  
In order to understand why and how this deviation occurred, this study seeks to address the 
following central research question:  
 What were the main factors that accounted for the shift in the ANC’s economic 
philosophy and policy orientation after the 1994 elections?  
In order to address this central research question, it is also necessary to explore the 
following secondary research questions:  
 What were the main political and economic factors that resulted in the ANC 
adopting the Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) macroeconomic 
strategy?  
 
 How did the post-cold war international political-economic context impact on the 
ANC’s economic thinking and planning when it was elected as South Africa’s first 
democratic government in 1994? 
 
 How did the adoption of the GEAR strategy shape South Africa’s post-apartheid 
economic planning and performance? 
 
 
 
                                                          
15
 South African History Online: towards a people’s history, accessed, March 12,2014,   
www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/first-democratic-election-held-south-africa-0 
16
 Thembinkosi L. Lehloesa, South Africa’s Growth Economic And Redistribution Strategy, 1-4 
17
 The Freedom Charter, accessed March 12, 2014 http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=72  
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OBJECTIVE OF THE THESIS:  
This thesis does not introduce any new material to the ongoing debates around South 
Africa’s post-apartheid political economy. It aims to undertake a rigorous interpretation of 
the existing literature and expand upon the analytical perspectives which attempt to explain 
what influences inform the state of democratic South Africa’s economic performance and 
planning. This report  accepts the neoliberal characterisation of South Africa’s post-
apartheid economy, as demonstrated in chapters two and three which illustrate the ANC’s 
deviation from its liberation development mandate.18  
The characterisation of GEAR as being a neoliberal experiment also stems from the ANC 
government’s own admission when it communicated that “in isolation certain measures in 
GEAR are similar to many neoliberal packages”.19  The economic debate in South Africa also 
tends to assume a state versus the market dichotomy; this is a premise which this thesis 
rejects as unhelpful. This dichotomy is rejected on the basis that it tends to overlook the 
interaction between the state and market. It also overlooks the recognition of the 
interaction between that state and the market as being a product of economic interests 
exerted upon them by specific classes.20  
The research questions above have been selected to help us understand the factors that 
account for post-apartheid South Africa’s economic policy choices as well as the democratic 
dispensation’s economic policy making process albeit to a limited degree. Further, they will 
also assist us in terms of understanding the features that have characterised South Africa’s 
post-apartheid economic landscape. The ANC has placed transformation at the apex of its 
democratic narrative, as it attempts to reverse the apartheid legacy of structural exclusion 
of the majority of citizens from participating meaningfully in South Africa’s political and 
economic life.21 Therefore, asking the above questions will assist us to determine the extent 
to which the ANC is succeeding in the pursuit of its transformation agenda. 
Key gains have been made in 20 years of democratic governance, however; South Africa still 
experiences high instances of poverty, unemployment and inequality. It has been suggested 
by scholars such as Anthony Butler that some of the country’s developmental challenges can 
be attributed to a partial failure of the ANC’s organisational machinations, or what he 
describes as ‘organisational weaknesses’. Butler states that, “the ANC has found itself 
unable to advance coherent and credible economic and developmental policies”.22  
                                                          
18
 Patrick Bond, “Elite transition”, Pluto Press 2000, 1-3 
19
 “GEAR, the RDP and the role of the State”, quoted in Hein Marais, “South Africa –Limits to Change, 160-166 
20
 Ben Fine and Zavareh Rustomjee, “The Political Economy of South Africa: From Minerals-Energy Complex to 
Industrialisation”, (C. Hurst & Co. Publishers Ltd, 1996), 71-76.   
21
 Ben Turok, “ Readings in the ANC tradition-The Road to South African Freedom: The Programme of the 
South African Communist Party”, (Adopted by the fifth national conference of the South African Communist 
Party), (Jacana 2011), 14-19 
22
Anthony Butler, “Remaking the ANC, Party Change in South Africa and the Global South”, (Jacana Media 
2014), 1-13.  
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In attempting to answer the above research questions, this research intends to provide an 
analysis which attempts to reflect on the political and economic changes and/or continuities 
in South Africa after the transition to democracy. This will provide a yardstick of the 
progress the ANC has made as the first democratic government.23 A singular focus on the 
organisational capacity of the ANC as suggested by Butler, limits the extent to which the 
above research questions can adequately reflect changes and/or continuities.  
The post-apartheid South African state has hitherto failed to fundamentally alter the 
structure of the South African economy and thus distributional regime of the state.24 This 
has resulted in the persistence in patterns of income inequality, as accurately suggested by 
scholars such as Nattrass and Seekings.  They also suggest that in the post-apartheid context 
income inequality unfolds less along racial lines as it does along class lines, given the 
abandonment of explicit racially exclusionary policies.25 This thesis disagrees with this 
analysis as it implies somewhat of an equaliser between races and eliminates race as a 
factor in determining income equality. The burdens of poverty, unemployment and 
inequality in post-apartheid South Africa, remain disproportionately black, as demonstrated 
in chapter four of this thesis.  
                                                          
23 Pons-Vignon N. & Segatti A (2013) ‘The art of neoliberalism’: 
accumulation, institutional change and social order since the end of apartheid, Review of African 
Political Economy, 40:138, 507-518, DOI: 10.1080/03056244.2013.859449  
24
 Niccoli Nattrass, Jeremy Seekings, “Class Race and Inequality in South Africa”, (Yale University 2005), *  
25
 Nattrass and Seekings, Class Race, * 
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RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHOD 
The design of this study adopts the single case study method which intends to provide an in-
depth analysis26 of the case of South Africa’s economic planning and performance after 
1994. Through selecting South Africa as a case, this study hopes to establish clarity around 
how the ANC government experienced economic policy decision making after 1994 and 
what impact this has had on South Africa’s economic performance.27 Therefore, the 
relevance of the case study method in this instance is applicable given that this study 
addresses a descriptive central research question as well as secondary research questions.28   
The focus of this study is to provide answers to the how and why aspects of the research 
questions posed above. Further, clarity is sought around the contextual conditions within 
which the ANC deviated from its historical economic philosophy after 1994 and how they 
impacted on the ANC’s economic decision making, as this link cannot be assumed.29 
Therefore, this serves to strengthen the case for applying the single case method.   
In the main a qualitative analysis of secondary literature was conducted. This included: ANC 
and government policy documents, books, academic journals as well as internet based 
articles and newspapers. The study also describes and analyses historical events and 
consequently how these have impacted on post-apartheid South Africa’s political economic 
landscape. In terms of the time dimension the primary focus is placed on the period from 
1994 to the present, however, the study also looks into the 1970s and 1980s with the aim of 
reflecting on the economic policy evolution of democratic South Africa.  
                                                          
26
 Donna M, Zucker, “ How to do Case Study Research, University of Massachusetts”, (School of Nursing Faculty 
Publication series , 2009) 
http://scholarworks.umass.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=nursing_faculty_pubs  
27 Pamela Baxter  and Susan Jack, “Qualitative, Study design and implementation for novice 
researchers”, (The Qualitative Report Volume 13 Number 4 December 2008) 544-559.  
http://www.nova.edu/ssss/QR/QR13-4/baxter.pdf 
28
 A very brief refresher on the Case Study Method;  http://www.sagepub.com/upm-data/41407_1.pdf  
29 Pamela Baxter and Susan Jack: Qualitative, Study design, 544-559.  
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CHAPTER STRUCTURE 
The first Chapter attempts to provide an overview of the conceptual underpinnings which 
inform the neoliberal paradigm. In this regard, it links neoliberalism to classical economics 
ideas deriving from the 18th century, which espouse the idea that human interactions are 
maximised through the free market. The idea of a free market have shaped various epochs 
in the evolution of capitalism and were revived in the late 1970s and consolidated in the 
1980s with the dominance of neoliberalism. Of particular importance in this regard is the 
historical context against which South Africa’s transition from apartheid to democracy took 
place. The ANC assumed governance in a post-cold war global political economy which had 
been punctuated by the collapse of communism and the concomitant rise and dominance of 
neoliberalism. Neoliberal discourse and practices set the ideological scene for political and 
economic governance during this time.30 Therefore an illustration of the theoretical and 
historical underpinnings of neoliberalism is important in order to contextualise the post-
apartheid political- economic landscape and what influenced it.  
The second chapter attempts to illustrate the political historical evolution of neoliberalism 
and demonstrates how South Africa’s transition from democracy to apartheid occurred 
against a global context which was subsumed by neoliberal thinking and practice in the late 
1980s going into the early and mid-1990s. It also attempts to demonstrate how the calls for 
neoliberal reforms in South Africa began with the racist National Party government in the 
late 1980s through its Normative Economic Model document’s macroeconomic policy 
proposals. Thus, if anything economic planning in democratic South Africa reflects more 
continuity than a change.  
The third chapter attempts to illustrate how the ANC gradually conceded its developmental 
vision which envisaged a state led growth through redistribution macroeconomic regime, 
for a transformed post-apartheid South Africa and thus shifted towards and acceptance of 
the dominant neoliberal status quo. Despite a weighted counter argument from its allies the 
ANC led government through its key decision makers, insisted in following an orthodox 
economic path which would give primacy to the markets as a means through which it would 
achieve its democratic transformation goals.  
In the fourth chapter this study aims to illustrate the consequences and thus failures of 
GEAR to achieve what its architects had professed it would achieve. Through an analysis of 
the various economic policy frameworks that follow GEAR, this study attempts to 
demonstrate how these frameworks seem to continue the neoliberal assumptions made by 
GEAR. It argues that the tendency of neoliberal policies is to demonstrate a progressive 
social decline which is to an extent evident in South Africa’s rising levels of poverty, 
unemployment and inequality. 
                                                          
30
 Sean Jacobs, My Ten Years of Freedom, 90.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE STATE VERSUS THE MARKET: A CONCEPTUAL OVERVIEW 
“The central lesson that emerges from this story of the boom and bust- that there needs to 
be a balance between the role of government and of the market- is one which evidently the 
world has to learn over and over again”.31 – Joseph Stiglitz  
INTRODUCTION 
The post-Cold War era saw the resurgence of economic orthodoxy in the configuration of 
global political economic relations. Thus the thinking which gave primacy to the state as a 
central actor responsible for the provision of basic social and economic needs gave way to 
the thinking that the market would better serve this function.  The predominance of this 
belief in the primacy of the market has tended to subordinate the implementation of 
economic policies which prioritise the needs addressing people’s basic needs, whilst 
prioritising market interests.     
This chapter aims to critically examine the widely accepted assumptions of the free market 
or market fundamentalism, which have influenced the post-cold war political economic 
landscape in which the ANC assumed governance. It will argue that the notion of a free 
market is a utopian proposition, which cannot be realised in practice. The consequences of 
free market policy implementation tend to be antagonistic towards the consolidation of 
prospects for development. To this end policies which promote significant degrees of state 
intervention have been more successful as they are more concerned with addressing the 
needs of the people.  
This chapter is organised into two sections, the first section will trace the historical and 
theoretical assumptions of free market discourse and practice and illustrate the conceptual 
underpinnings of neoliberalism. The second section aims to challenge the assumptions of 
the free market and will argue that the notion of a free market is a utopian proposition 
because every market is governed by some form of regulation in practice. It will emphasise 
the limitations of the notion of the free market and allude to an alternative paradigm.   
MARKET FUNDAMENTALISM, A HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL OVERVIEW:  
The notion of the primacy of a free market or market fundamentalism is the conceptual 
anchor of Neoliberal thought and practice, as will be demonstrated later. It is rooted in the 
long standing historical and philosophical tradition of liberalism. Liberalism’s central 
conceptual political and economic tenets respectively, are upholding the right of the 
individual and maintaining a deep seated belief that a free market is the best means 
through which economic activity in society can be organised.32 This history can be traced as 
far back to political theorists such as John Locke, who posited the idea of popular 
                                                          
31
 Joseph Stiglitz, quoted in Dr Lee Boldeman, “The Cult of the Market: Economic fundamentalism and its 
Discontents”,  (University Printing Services, ANU, 2007),3  
32
 Andrew Heywood, “Politics”, (Palgrave Macmillan, Third Edition 2007), 45-47.  
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sovereignty and religious tolerance at the end of the seventeenth century. The development 
of liberalism as a political phenomenon emerged at the beginning of the nineteenth century 
in Sweden and Spain, with the establishment of the liberal parliamentary caucuses, and 
spread to the rest of Europe. It was also buoyed by the democratic systems that the Swedish 
and Spanish were observing in England and America. Liberalism has thus dominated 
normative political discourse for at least the past six centuries, emphasising its cardinal 
values of individual freedom and democracy.33 
The economic dimensions of liberalism or ‘economic liberalism’ emerged strongly in 19th 
century England, in Manchester. The Manchester system was premised on laissez –faire 
economics and closely associated with the notion of ‘free-trade’.  What was embedded in 
the notion of free trade was the idea that markets need to be free or unencumbered and 
this would thus best serve the function of allocating resources in society. The Manchester 
system was particularly concerned with the repeal of England’s Corn Law, which was 
responsible for the restriction of wheat importation.34 Drawing heavily from its political 
dimensions, economic liberalism placed emphasis on the centrality of individual freedom 
and the primacy of the market in the organisation of economic activity.  
The rationale for this could be traced in classical economic thought as reflected in the work 
of Adam Smith- one of the foremost proponents of market primacy- who argued for the 
notion of the ‘invisible hand’ as the best regulator for economic activity amongst individuals 
who acted in pursuit of self-interest. This served as justification to limit the role of the public 
good and/or the state to that of observer and enforcer of the rules where necessary.  Smith 
argued that:  
“as every individual therefore endeavours as much as he can to employ his capital in 
the support of domestic industry, and so to direct that industry that its produce may 
be of the greatest value, every individual necessarily labours to render the annual 
revenue of the society as great as he can. He generally, indeed, neither intends to 
promote public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. By preferring the 
support of domestic to that of foreign industry, he intends only his own security; and 
by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of greatest value, 
he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an 
invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intentions. Nor is it always 
the worse for the society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own interests, he 
frequently promotes that of society more effectively than when he really intends to 
promote it. I have never known much good by those who affected to trade for the 
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public. It is an affectation, indeed, not common amongst merchants, and very few 
words need be employed in dissuading them from it”.35  
Therefore, as noted by Thorsen and Lie, the classical liberal economic notion emphasises 
that the state “ought to be minimal, which means that practically everything except armed 
forces, law enforcement and other ‘non excludable goods’ ought to be left to the free 
dealings of its citizens, and the organisations they freely choose to establish and take part 
in. This kind of State is sometimes described as the ‘night-watchman’ state, as the sole 
purpose of the minimal state is to uphold the most fundamental aspects of public order”.36 
Thus this conception of the minimal state would be advanced by proponents of market 
fundamentalism. Centuries later these ideas would find resonance with scholars such as 
Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek- academic economists- who would expound on them, 
thus bringing them back to the centre of contemporary political economic discourse.  
Friedrich Hayek took exception to what he perceived as the dominance of socialist ideas in 
the 1940s and sought to proactively counter this dominance by championing the philosophy 
of freedom in political economic discourse. This lead to the establishment of the Mont 
Pelerin Society in September 1947, a meeting of economic academic philosophers convened 
by Hayek, who would work to counter the dominance of socialist ideas and advance the 
ideas of the free market and market fundamentalism.37  
“The Society’s aim was not to exert an immediate influence on policy but to have a 
long-term influence on the climate of opinion…The Mont Pelerin Society became the 
centre of the network that included individuals and organisations concerned to 
sponsor free market ideas, think tanks, academic economists, including many who 
were either members of the Chicago school of economics or had been trained 
there”.38  
Hayek’s initiative would set the tone for the conceptual foundation for the ascendance of 
free-market ideals in late 1970s and beginning of the 1980s.   
In 1980 Milton Freidman co-authored a book with Rose Friedman entitled “Free to choose”. 
In this book they expressed support for  the ideas of Adam Smith, when they contended 
that the free market system combined with individual freedom to pursue one’s own ends, 
underpinned by voluntary cooperation, was best placed to allocate the resources required 
for society to function. The Milton and Rose Friedman argued that:  
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“Adam Smith’s key insight was that both parties to an exchange can benefit and that 
so long as cooperation is strictly voluntary, no exchange will take place unless both 
parties do benefit. No external force, coercion, no violation of freedom is necessary 
to produce cooperation among individuals all of whom can benefit…A predominantly 
voluntary exchange economy, on the other hand, has within it the potential to 
promote both prosperity and human freedom”.39  
This elevation of the market was underpinned by a concomitant criticism of state 
involvement, which they cautioned would be a “sure recipe for tyranny” unless state power 
was offset by the free market.40 These ideas which underscored an unwavering belief in the 
efficiency of the free market gained wide acceptance, however their acceptance has been 
largely uncritical. It is against this backdrop that this can be referred to as market 
fundamentalism, the reference to fundamentalism signifies a strict and literal adherence to 
a set of basic principles in this case those of the free market.41 The next section will critically 
analyse and illustrate the limitations of the free market.   
LIMITS TO MARKET FUNDAMENTALISM:  
When confronting the adherence to the free market and its concomitant assumptions, a 
critical consideration to be taken into cognisance is that as a matter of fact, the free market 
does not exist.  The extent to which a market is considered to be free hinges on the 
deliberate refusal to recognise that the rules and/or regulations, through which market 
actors determine their interaction, are in essence restrictions to the freedom of the market. 
This argument is well illustrated by scholars such as Ha Joon Chang, for Chang: 
 “Every market has some rules and boundaries that restrict freedom of choice. A 
market looks free only because we so unconditionally accept its underlying 
restrictions that we fail to see them. How free a market is cannot be objectively 
defined. It is a political definition…Government is always involved and those free-
marketeers are as politically motivated as anyone”.42   
Further, the notion of a free market assumes that the economic function in a society can be 
separated from the rest of society and that ultimately the market can subordinate all of 
society to its demands. This is accorded by its ‘self-regulating’ character. Not only is the 
notion of a neat separation between the economy and the rest of society a fallacy, the 
consequences of such thinking can bring to bear insidious consequences to the general 
harmonious functioning of the society.  This is an argument also articulated by thinkers such 
as Karl Polanyi who suggested that:  
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“A self-regulating market demands nothing less than the institutional separation of 
society into an economic and political sphere. Such a dichotomy is in effect, merely a 
restatement, from the point of view of a society as a whole, of the existence of a 
self-regulating market. It might be argued that the separateness of the two spheres 
obtains in every type of society at all times. Such an inference, however, would be 
based on a fallacy. True, no society can exist without a system of some kind which 
ensures order in the production and distribution of goods. But that does not imply 
the existence of separate economic institutions; normally, the economic order is 
merely a function of the social in which it is contained”.43   
Therefore the idea that the market should operate as its own arbiter through its ‘self-
regulating character requires that certain key components -namely land, labour and money- 
of the production process be commoditised. That is, they can be bought and sold subject to 
their interaction with price, which is the logic of the market. In essence, it is an artificial 
proposition. Given that labour and land are in effect human beings and nature respectively, 
their respective subordination to the market is most likely to be a perilous endeavour.44 
Critically, in this regard Polanyi observes that: 
“In regard to labour, land and money such a postulate cannot be upheld. To allow 
the market mechanism to be sole director of the fate of human beings and their 
natural environment, indeed, even of the amount and use of purchasing power, 
would result in the demolition of society. For the alleged commodity ‘labour power’ 
cannot be shoved about, used indiscriminately, or even left unused, without 
affecting also the human individual who happens to be the bearer of this peculiar 
commodity. In disposing of a man’s labour power the system would, incidentally, 
dispose of the physical, psychological, and moral entity ‘man’ attached to that tag. 
Robbed of the protective covering of cultural institutions, human beings would 
perish from the effects of social exposure; they would die as the victims of acute 
social dislocation through vice, perversion, crime, and starvation. Nature would be 
reduced to its elements, neighbourhoods and landscapes defiled, rivers polluted, 
military safety jeopardized, the power to produce food and raw materials 
destroyed”.45   
 
 
It is these complexities of human and natural life highlighted by Polanyi which the notion of 
a self-regulating free market fails to take into account in its artificial postulation of a market 
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led society. In recent economic history scholars such as Boldeman have referred to free 
market adherence as the ‘uncritical and excessive adulation of markets’. After the Cold War 
in particular, the free market has emerged as a dominant paradigm in contemporary 
political-economic policy formulation.46 This excessive faith in the market is also fuelled by 
the privileged status enjoyed by economics in the social sciences, which has unduly 
rendered economics an overarching determinant of general social and policy action.  
Boldeman also observes that “in this regard, it is important to recognise that the 
exaggerated claim of economic fundamentalism is a claim to moral authority: authority to 
determine policy directions based on an assertion of superior economic knowledge-
knowledge of the way in which the economy operates and should operate”.47 There are 
limitations to the notion of the centrality of economics in public policy formulation.  
Consequently, there are also limitations on the notion of market fundamentalism; and 
individual hard work as determinants for the efficacious allocation of resources in society as 
advanced by Adam Smith.  
The insistence on adherence to the free market does not take into account the coalescing of 
complex and/or varied social arrangements, which are shaped by uneven power 
relationships in society; which in turn privilege certain ideas and practices over others, 
especially when it pertains to the social and economic organisation of society.48 In this 
regard scholars Martin Hollis and Edward Nell contend that:  
“Individual incomes do not result from individual hard work but form exercises of 
power, political decisions, tradition and other social forces; not least the hierarchical 
organisation of productive work…The clear implication is that there is no natural nor 
any efficient allocation of incomes. A competitive scramble for incomes is simply a 
power struggle and there is no hope of basing an ‘incomes policy’ on the notion of 
‘productive contribution’ or ‘efficiency’”.49  
This further attests to the fallacious postulation of the market mechanism being the best 
option for organising society.  It is against this backdrop that we understand that the core 
principles of neoliberal theory are derived from the liberal philosophical tradition, with its 
particular conceptions of social and human life which place specific emphasis on 
individualism and self-interest as the ultimate expression of freedom.50 
The various epochs in the historical evolution of capitalism have been punctuated by debate 
around the role of the state in relation to the market. For instance, Ha Joon Chang draws 
our attention to the conventional neoliberal wisdom which hastens to point out that the 
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best recorded historical periods of economic growth and development occurred under 
conditions of the free market and free trade policy implementation.51 However, this is a 
fundamentally distorted depiction of the history of capitalism; to this end Joon Chang 
suggest that “contrary to the official history of capitalism, virtually all now developed 
countries (NDCs) have actively used tariffs, subsidies and other measures of intervention, 
especially in the early days of their development”.52  Earlier in this chapter it was pointed 
out that the free market is at best an unattainable utopia.  
The argument is that state intervention is a necessary ingredient for development as 
illustrated above. For instance, historically, a weak correlation between economic orthodoxy 
and job creation can be identified.53 Neoliberal policies insist on labour market deregulation, 
the result has been a decline in the real value of the minimum wage and the creation of an 
insecure work environment. In turn, this has ultimately resulted in a general increase in 
wage and income inequality.54 However, this will be explored in more detail later in the 
thesis. The priorities of neoliberalism are antagonistic towards development priorities 
precisely because they are primarily concerned with the expansion of markets, facilitating 
open competition and enhancing mass production.55   
When the ANC assumed governance after 1994, the expectation was that the new 
government would address the cruel legacy of racially informed poverty and inequality. 
Initially the government promoted interventionist economic reforms in the Reconstruction 
and Development programme (RDP) base document. However, these reforms were soon 
replaced with the implementation of neoliberal free market biased reforms, concerned 
mainly with orthodox stabilisation objectives.56 Whilst not discounting fiscal prudence and 
sound monetary policy, significant government intervention in South Africa is desirable to 
ensure that the necessary conditions are in place to attain economic growth that can 
eliminate poverty and inequality.57  
 
 
 
                                                          
51
 Ha Joon Chang, “The Market , the State and Institutions in Economic Development”, 42-45  
52
 Ha Joon Chang, The Market, the state, 43 
53
 Ian Van Vuuren, “Varieties of Neoliberalism”,2013.   
54
 Thomas I Palley : From Keynesianism to Neoliberalism, 20  
55
 Shamsul M. Haque, “The fate of Sustainable Development under Neoliberal regimes in Developing 
countries”, (International Political Science Review (1999), Vol. 20, No. 2), 197–218 
http://profile.nus.edu.sg/fass/polhaque/ipsr-sd.pdf   
56
 George Abalu , Firmino Mucavele, Davies N’gon gola, Johan Van Rooyen , Johan F. Kirsten, Johan Van Zyl, 
Olivier S. Saasa, Tracey Simbi, Gordon Sithole, Nick Vink, “Comparative analysis of Structural adjustment 
Programmes in Southern Africa: With Emphasis on Agriculture and Trade”, (SD Publication Series, Office of 
Sustainable Development Bureau for Africa, Technical paper no.23, 1996)  
57
 George Abalu, Firmino Mucavele, Davies N’gon gola, Johan Van Rooyen, Johan F. Kirsten, Johan Van Zyl, 
Oliver S. Saasa, Tracey Simbi, Gordon Sithole, Nick Vink, Comparative analysis of Structural adjustment, 31-37 
17 | P a g e  
 
CONCLUSION:  
The purpose of this chapter was to illustrate the limitations of the assumptions of the free 
market. It has traced the historical and theoretical underpinnings of the free market or 
market fundamentalism which have significantly shaped the conceptual and practical 
parameters; and thus trajectory of the post-cold war global political economy in which the 
ANC assumed governance, through the rise of neoliberalism. This chapter has attempted to 
demonstrate that the proposals advanced by the notion of the free market are at best a 
utopian proposition and out of touch with the complex social reality of human and natural 
life. Every market is governed by some form of regulations; therefore a free market in 
practice is unattainable. This chapter has argued that the prospects for development are 
significantly diminished by the proposals of free market thinking, as it is less concerned with 
addressing the basic needs of the people. Attention will now be turned to a critical 
illustration of the historical international context which gave resurgence to the adherence to 
the ideas of the free market. The beginning of South Africa’s interaction with these ideas 
will also be highlighted.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
NEOLIBERALISM A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW: SOUTH AFRICA IN A CHANGING GLOBAL 
ORDER  
INTRODUCTION:  
The years 1978 to 1980 left an indelible mark on the configuration of global, political and 
economic history. In 1978 under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, China embarked on an 
economic liberalisation path, which steered it away from what was an unmistakable 
communist economic system. 1979 saw the appointment of Paul Volcker as the head of the 
US Federal Reserve, Volcker’s appointment saw the Federal Reserve assume the lead in 
combating inflation, with scant regard for consequences, in particular the impact on 
employment. In May of the same year in Britain, Margret Thatcher was elected as Prime 
minister, on the electoral ticket that she would curtail trade union power and bring an end 
to inflationary stagnation, which had afflicted Britain in the preceding decades. The year 
1980 saw the election of Ronald Reagan as the US president, his mandate was to buttress 
the work that Volcker had begun at the Federal Reserve, deregulate industry, and set in 
motion the ascendance of financial power both domestically and internationally.58 
The cumulative impact of these events saw a radical reconfiguration of the global political 
economy. It ushered in a shift away from Keynesian state led developmental economics or 
embedded liberalism, towards an economic trajectory that accorded primacy to the market, 
or market fundamentalism as a means for economic organisation. South Africa’s democratic 
transition occurred within this specific global context, this global context was marked inter-
alia, by the collapse of the Berlin wall- a symbol of the Cold War- thus signalling the end of 
Cold War ideological hostilities between the USA and Russia who were the main 
protagonists, as well as the defeat of communism as political force.59   
Further, the end of the Cold War saw the acceleration of a new phase-which had been 
gaining momentum since the 1970- in global political-economic thinking and practice. This 
brought about an increase in global economic integration which was highly uneven, as well 
as increased trade liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation.60 Therefore, when the 
newly elected African National Congress (ANC) government began to consider and 
subsequently craft its political economic vision geared towards its transformation aims, it 
would have to contend with a rapidly shifting global political-economic context which bore 
features that were not necessarily conducive to the ANC’s vision of transformation through 
a developmental prism.  
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This chapter aims to critically illustrate how neoliberalism emerged and ascended to 
consolidate its status as a hegemonic political economic discourse and practice 
internationally. It primarily argues that concern around the declining fortunes of capital 
accumulation globally and the subsequent attempt to revitalise them, drove key historical 
elite actors to set in motion a neoliberal reform agenda for the global economy which would 
have geopolitical implications beyond the centres of Western European capitalism. South 
Africa which was located on the southern tip of the African continent was not insulated 
from these global events, and more so after the collapse of communism in the late 1980s.  
This chapter is organised into three primary sections. The first section traces the key 
historical events which gave rise to the dominance of neoliberal discourse and practice; it 
also offers a concrete definition of neoliberalism.  This section makes the argument that 
neoliberalism is consistent with the conceptual assumptions made by market 
fundamentalism and thus informs neoliberal practice, this is important because it 
underscores the conceptual underpinnings of neoliberalism. However, neoliberalism in 
practice is at odds with its theoretical assumptions, particularly with regards to the role of 
the state.  
The second section highlights the geopolitical impact of neoliberal practice on the African 
continent. It argues that the implementation of neoliberal policies adversely affected 
prospects for development on the African continent. This is important because it illustrates 
the far reaching influence of neoliberal discourse and practice. The third section analyses 
the political economic conditions in South Africa which gave rise to neoliberal discourse, 
which was introduced by the beleaguered National Party government. In this section, it is 
argued that declining fortunes in domestic capital accumulation informed calls for neoliberal 
reforms. In a similar fashion to their international counter parts, South African elite actors 
were at the forefront of agitating for a neoliberal reform agenda domestically. Despite this, 
South Africa’s post-apartheid economic trajectory was not a given.  Overall, these 
arguments aim to account for the factors which precipitated the ANC’s shift away from its 
developmental vision towards adopting economic policies that would prioritise neoliberal 
economic reforms.   .   
THE ASCENDANCE OF NEOLIBERALISM AND THE GLOBAL CONTEXT 
The period after the Second World War brought about the ‘Golden Age of social democratic 
capitalism’ which spanned the period 1950-1973.  This was characterised by unprecedented 
levels of economic growth and industrial expansion for the United States of America (USA) 
and its European allies. It also marked the United States of America’s rise as the hegemonic 
capitalist centre.61 Sampie Terreblanche attributes this economic success to a compact 
within and between Western countries based on: 
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“two social democratic contracts: a domestic social democratic consensus to create 
greater social justice and social stability in the domestic affairs of all the capitalist 
countries in the West; and an international social democratic consensus to stabilise 
the capital flows and the economic relationship between Western capitalist 
Countries.”62  
What had essentially emerged after the Second World War was a general consensus that 
stability and development were desired and that conditions needed to be created to 
prevent conflict on the scale experienced in the war. 63 In pursuit of this new post war vision 
various state forms had emerged in the USA and Europe. These ranged from, liberal 
democratic state in the USA to social democratic, Christian democratic as well dirigiste state 
forms in Europe. David Harvey, a leading economic theorist notes that: 
“what all of these various state forms had in common was an acceptance that the 
state should focus on full employment, economic growth, and the welfare of its 
citizens, and that state power should be freely deployed, alongside of or, if 
necessary, intervening in or even substituting for market process to achieve these 
ends. Fiscal and monetary policies usually dubbed ‘Keynesian’ were widely deployed 
to dampen business cycles and to ensure reasonably full employment”.64 
This arrangement was buttressed by a ‘class compromise’ between capital and labour which 
also served as a guarantor for domestic peace and stability.65 However, the end of the 1960s 
going into the mid -1970s saw an end to the post war economic boom and international 
political- economic stability; The USA and European economies began to experience a 
serious crisis of capital accumulation.66 The crisis resulted in a phenomenon known as 
stagflation, which saw economic slow-down on the on the one hand and high inflation on 
the other hand.  
Such a crisis had not been anticipated by the Keynesian system, which was at this point in 
disarray.67 A significant effect that this crisis of capital accumulation had, was that it 
threatened the economic elite classes in the USA and the respective European countries 
who had all the while had their power somewhat restrained by the class compromise which 
had brought about the post war economic boom. The crisis was exacerbated by the OPEC oil 
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embargo of 1973, which saw acute increases in oil prices thus placing significant financial 
power in the hands of oil producing states such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi.68 
In an attempt to revitalise and reorganise capital accumulation as well as reassert their 
economic control, the elite economic classes turned to Neoliberalism, which saw the 
ascendance of orthodox/classical economic thinking and practice in domestic and global 
political economic organisation. A definition of Neoliberalism would be crucial towards 
framing a critical discussion of it, therefore, this research will accept David Harvey’s 
definition of Neoliberalism which suggests that: 
“Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political-economic practices that 
proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual 
entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterised 
by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade. The role of the state 
is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices. 
The state has to guarantee, for example, the quality and integrity of money. It must 
also set up those military, defence, policy, and legal structures and functions 
required to secure private property rights and to guarantee, by force if need be, the 
proper functioning of markets. Furthermore, if markets do not exist (in areas such as 
land, water, education, health care, social security, or environmental pollution) then 
they must be created, by state action if necessary. But beyond these tasks the state 
should not venture. State intervention in markets once created must be kept to a 
bare minimum because, according to the theory, the state cannot possibly possess 
enough information to second-guess market signals (prices) and because powerful 
interest groups will inevitably distort and bias state interventions (particularly in 
democracies) for their own benefit”.69  
Harvey offers a comprehensive definition of Neoliberalism which not only crucially takes 
into cognisance the intersection between state and market –a contradiction according to 
neoliberalism- but also demonstrates Neoliberalism’s consistency with the ideology of 
market fundamentalism as espoused by classical liberal and economic traditions.  
However, it is also critical to note that Neoliberalism was not an inevitable outcome, as 
Neoliberal policies resulted from a set of chaotic political-economy experiments which 
ultimately culminated in the Washington consensus.70 The USA -under the leadership of 
Richard Nixon- had experienced severe economic setbacks, moved swiftly to unilaterally fix 
the gold-dollar exchange, upon Europe’s refusal to appreciate its currency in order to 
improve the international competitiveness of the US. This move coincided with the 
abandonment of the original Bretton Woods system of 1944 which was responsible for the 
golden age of State led capitalist economic growth.  
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This in turn led the USA to create large amounts of money, effectively increasing its money 
supply exponentially; thus in turn resulting in the quick accumulation of financial assets. The 
result of this was increased speculation in the global economy and foreign exchange 
markets, a practice which had been discouraged by the Bretton Woods conference of 
1944.71 At this point the revitalisation of neoclassical economic orthodoxy was firmly in 
motion.  
Neoliberalism ensured a broad policy agenda which would coalesce against Keynesian 
thinking. This saw a dogmatic like emphasis on measures such as fiscal discipline which 
placed emphasis on macroeconomic stability and trade liberalisation. This would lead to the 
removal of tariffs and other protection measures of domestic economies.  
Liberalised financial markets which resulted in the end of state directed credit were 
prioritised. Emphasis was also placed on the privatisation of state enterprises as well as the 
deregulation of markets to ensure the ease of competition coupled with an emphasis on 
foreign direct investment as a means to stimulate economic investment gained centrality. 
These measures came to be known collectively as the Washington Consensus.72 
Proponents of Neoliberalism continued to argue that reform of the monetary and banking 
system were necessary to ensure non- interference with the money supply and that fiscal 
reform by governments was a necessity. Further, they argued that profound changes in 
production had taken place in the 1980s following the crisis and therefore, these changes 
necessitated trade liberalisation and thus the integration of national economies as a means 
to expand markets.73 This system was guaranteed by institutions such as the IMF and World 
Bank, which ensured that governments were accountable to international agencies with 
regards to trade liberalisation and exchange rate stability.74 
The cumulative impact of these policies was that they marked a significant turning point in 
the global economy and brought about the: 
“…subordination of domestic economies to the perceived exigencies of a global 
economy. States willy-nilly became more effectively accountable to a nebuleuse 
personified as the global economy; and they were constrained to mystify this 
external accountability in the eyes and ears of their own publics through the new 
vocabulary of globalisation, interdependence and competitiveness.”75  
Thus the rise of Neoliberalism was cemented as these arguments gained ascendency. Critics 
hastened to point out that Neoliberal policies had culminated in diminishing the role of the 
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State in crucial spheres of economic and public life, thus exposing vulnerable groups in 
society to various risks. In this regard, Lehloesa notes that:  
“The infrastructural needs of communities, such as transport, communications and 
water drains, have also suffered, including the protection of the environment. Low 
income groups have also been exposed to markets and the participation of people in 
decision making processes has been steadily eroded”.76  
Harvey notes an inconsistency between what neoliberalism suggested theoretically and 
what it did in practice. In this regard, he argues that neoliberalism’s supposed theoretical 
distrust of all state power is in contrast with its practice as it depends on a “strong and if 
necessary coercive state to defend the rights of property, individual liberties and 
entrepreneurial freedoms”.77 Lehloesa also notes the same inconsistency when he suggests 
that; “states assist neoliberal demands by enforcing wage restraints, reallocating taxation 
from conglomerates, conferring property rights and establishing authoritative legal and 
political structures”.78 This is a thus a crucial demonstration of the contradiction alluded to 
earlier, in which the supposed resistance of state intervention by Neoliberal theory is in fact 
not its practice. This aspect will be examined in more detail later in this thesis.  
The economic policy influence of neoliberalism has extended beyond the western European 
capitalist centres and the United States of America. States in various regions of the world 
have embraced neoliberal policies either voluntarily or under some form of coercion.79 
Various types of capitalist neoliberal experiments also emerged, along the lines of the Anglo 
American, East Asian and European models.80  
In post-communist Eastern Europe for instance, neoliberal development reforms resulted in 
the massive decline in living standards. They were premised on the rationale that 
attempting to attract foreign mobile capital would lead to rapid development. Instead, the 
open competition it yielded culminated in severe social disruption and unproductive 
economic development.81 The following section will assess the general impact of neoliberal 
led development on the African continent.   
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AFRICA AND NEOLIBERAL INFLUENCE:  
The predominance of Neoliberal development reforms had an adverse impact for 
developing countries, as alluded to above. The impact was more severe in the African 
context. Out of the global developing contexts namely; East Asia, Latin America and Africa, 
Africa has remained the poorest.82 
Neoliberalism was initially introduced through what became known as the ‘shock therapy’ 
phase or the ‘Washington Consensus’.83 When dealing with developing countries in general 
and African countries in particular it imposed certain prescriptions. These prescriptions 
included the need to ensure: fiscal discipline, a redirection of public expenditure priorities 
towards fields offering both high economic reforms and the potential to improve income 
distribution, such as primary healthcare, primary education and infrastructure, tax reform to 
lower marginal rates and broaden the tax bone, interest rate liberalisation, a competitive 
exchange rate, trade liberalisation, liberalisation of inflows of foreign direct investment, 
Privatisation, deregulation to abolish entry and exit barriers and Secure property rights.84 In 
this regard, Wing Thye Woo argued that the Washington Consensus ran the danger of 
“denying the State its rightful role in providing an important range of public goods”.85 
 
Former chief economist of the World Bank Joseph Stiglitz noted the adverse impacts of the 
Washington consensus on the African continent when he suggested that:   
 
“In Africa, the costs of a simple-minded belief in the magic of the market were 
palpable and huge. For example, policy conditionalities imposed on the countries of 
the region, too often focused much too narrowly on liberalization of agricultural 
prices without adequate attention to the prerequisites to make that effective such as 
functioning markets for inputs and outputs, credit availability and infrastructure 
(especially roads); the insistence on static comparative advantage led to the fallacy 
of composition whereby increasing exports of commodities by many countries led to 
collapse in their prices; financial sector reforms were focused excessively on making 
interest rates market determined in very thin and rudimentary markets leading often 
to prolonged periods of very high interest rates without improving the availability of 
credit”.86 
 
Further, the Washington Consensus also meant that policy making processes in Africa were 
subjected to interference by the World Bank and the IMF, despite continued assertions that 
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denied this.87 The impact of interference by the these agencies resulted in limited room for 
African policy makers to develop policies that were context specific due to excessive 
conditionalities imposed by the World Bank and IMF.88 This demonstrated that there was a 
failure on the part of the Washington Consensus in understanding economic structures in 
developing countries by focusing on too narrow a set of objectives and on too limited a set 
of instruments.89 This ensured that African economies were integrated into a global 
economic context which was unfavourable to their political-economic and developmental 
plight, thus imposing severe constraints on policy makers and the policy choices they could 
exercise. Ultimately, the consequence of the Washington consensus on the African contexts 
saw a progressive decline in living standards.90  
 
Therefore, when South Africa made its political transition to inclusive democratic 
governance, the African National Congress led Government was faced with the mammoth 
task of reviving an ailing economy, which it had inherited from its Nationalist Party 
predecessors. Moreover, the ANC would seek to do so in a way that would enable it to 
address its transformation aims as articulated in the Freedom Charter and later the 
Reconstruction and Development Programme base document (RDP).  After years of 
apartheid induced global isolation, the ANC led government would have to contend with a 
significantly altered global power dynamic, owing to changes brought about by the collapse 
of the Berlin wall.  
The ANC would also have to closely consider questions regarding South Africa’s position as a 
meaningful actor in the global “community of nations”. Moreover, a global “community of 
nations” in which a key ally in the Soviet Union had been significantly weakened, and its 
political power and communist ideological influence dwarfed in post-Cold War context. 
Hitherto, the ANC as a liberation movement had relied heavily on the influence of the 
communist ideology and support from the Russian led Soviet Union.91  
Despite this reality, the political economic direction that the ANC government would follow 
was not a given. Competing political economy paradigms such as the developmental 
approach had also registered critical international successes and thus was even more 
aligned with the ANC government’s RDP vision. Moreover, the existence of the 
developmental state as evidenced by the East Asian newly industrialised countries (Japan, 
Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore) had brought to the fore a concrete 
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example of political economic development success which is an alternative to the neo-
classical free market dominance.92    
SOUTH AFRICA AND NEOLIBERAL CONVERGENCE:  
-The South African Economy: A historical Perspective 
The twilight years of the apartheid era saw increasing demands for neoliberal reforms; this 
took place against the backdrop of declining fortunes for capitalist accumulation. The 1970s 
going into the 1980s saw economic growth rates drop below population growth rates by the 
mid -1980s, consequently economic growth levels stood at 0.9% against population growth 
over the two business cycles from 1982-83 to 1993-94, effectively resulting in a recession.93 
The recession spanning the period 1989-1993 recorded a fall in real terms of contributions 
by both the primary sector (in agriculture and mining) as well as the secondary sector (in 
manufacturing, construction and electricity), this was despite marginal improvements in the 
trade and finance sectors.94 
To compound this grim economic outlook, the South African economy experienced a drastic 
decline in gross domestic fixed investment, domestic investment as a proportion of GDP 
dropped from 27% to 15 % per cent over the period spanning 1983-1993. Moreover, the 
early 1990s saw some 40-50% of the economically active population being excluded from 
the formal economy due to a drastic decline in labour absorption, which fell from 60% to 
under 40% from the mid -1970s to 1994.95 Additionally, the creation of jobs relative to the 
growth in the economically active population was rather insignificant; in this regard 
Padayachee and Zarenda highlight the fact that “less than 1 in every 10 new entrants into 
the economically active population was being absorbed into employment in the formal 
sector”.96 
To a significant extent this grim economic picture was attributable to isolation and/or 
sanction measures that were imposed on South Africa. The impact of the sanctions saw 
South Africa’s economic growth slow down by approximately 1.5% per annum from the 
1980s into the mid -1990s.97  However, some businesses such as in the mining and 
agricultural sectors continued to thrive under apartheid labour restrictions, given their 
heavy reliance on informal or unskilled labour. On the other hand, businesses in the tertiary 
and services sectors such as trade and finance bore the brunt of South Africa’s dire 
economic prospects. Coupled with advances in technology, the restrictions –external and 
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internal –accruing to apartheid policies became untenable. 98 The National Party, now under 
the leadership of FW De Klerk, began to recognise and discuss the need for economic 
reforms. De Klerk sought to re-establish a link between the business sector and the state 
and began to bemoan the political- economic consequences of apartheid. In this regard he 
stated that the continuation of apartheid “if pursued, it would bring disaster to all peoples 
of our country-including my own”.99 
Scholars such as Jonathan Michie and Vishnu Padayachee charged that ‘political 
opportunism and economic profligacy’100 by the National party were also responsible for the 
economic malaise that South Africa had been experiencing. They noted that “the National 
party presided over a rapid growth in government debt as a proportion of GDP. The budget 
deficit rose from 0.9 per cent of GDP in 1989-90 to 9.2 per cent in 1992-93 and 10.8 per cent 
in 1993-94”.101  Despite this rapid increase in the budget deficit, the national debt was still in 
keeping with international standards of similar income bracket countries as South Africa.  
The status quo exposed other fault lines within South Africa’s economy; that is the inability 
of the South African economy to provide basic services for all of its citizens. By 1993, South 
Africa’s debt to GDP ratio stood at 14.8 per cent, compared to 45.8 per cent and 35.2 per 
cent for severely indebted countries and moderately indebted countries respectively. 
Effectively, apartheid South Africa’s debt management took place at the expense of the 
delivery of basic services to all of its citizens. This saw the apartheid regime preside over a 
decade of domestic economic and employment stagnation. In this regard Michie and 
Padayachee argue that “the apartheid regime had to operate a recessionary domestic 
economic policy in order to maintain a current account surplus to service the debt. 
Moreover, apartheid South Africa became the most unequal society in the world, with a 
Gini-co efficient which measured at 0.68 by 1975”.102 It was against this backdrop of 
declining fortunes for domestic and international capital accumulation, that the National 
Party leadership in conjunction with the most affected business sectors began agitating for 
economic adjustments and/or reforms.   
-The emergence of Neoliberal discourse in South Africa 
The National Party articulated its proposed economic reforms in the document: 
Restructuring of the South African Economy: A Normative Economic Model Approach 
(NEM). The proposals made by NEM assumed a largely neoliberal character. To a significant 
extent the measures proposed by the NEM document represented what could largely be 
understood as supply side stimulus measures. These would include the lifting of restrictions, 
liberalising the markets, integration into global markets –which had hitherto closed South 
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African business off from attracting and creating investment opportunities abroad- and the 
creation of a flexible labour dispensation with minimal state regulation.  
NEM also proposed a tax reduction to stimulate economic growth and warned that socio-
economic upliftment programmes should not be prioritised ahead of the developing the 
business sector, which it argued would ultimately be responsible for ensuring socio-
economic well-being. 103 At the core of these proposals was the assumption that South 
Africa would need to primarily rely on the market to remedy the economic malaise accruing 
to years of apartheid restriction and isolationist policies. This was in keeping with the rising 
international neoliberal current through the influence of the World Bank and IMF, who 
emerged as some of the key protagonists in South Africa’s political economic transition. 
The responsibility of rebuilding South Africa’s ailing economy would fall squarely on the 
shoulders of the ANC, who would soon ascend to government on the back of an emphatic 
electoral victory in 1994 to become South Africa’s first inclusive and democratically elected 
government. The ANC continued to articulate that it viewed its historical mission as ensuring 
the transformation of South Africa’s society and economy through a redistributive economic 
approach with the state as a key driver, as enunciated by the Freedom Charter. However, 
the proposals made by the NEM document went against the ANC’s ideological vision for a 
transformed democratic South Africa.  
A bid to arrest the decline in capital accumulation in turn resulted in a convergence between 
domestic, international business and the international financial institutions (IFI’s) who 
sought to secure the triumph of neoliberalism in post-apartheid South Africa through 
macroeconomic policy. It was at this point that the ANC’s attention was drawn to the reality 
of the highly contested nature of macroeconomic policy. Domestic and international 
business with the inadvertent aid of International Financial Institutions exerted pressure on 
the ANC’s leadership to adopt a macroeconomic policy direction that would reflect 
neoliberal interests and endorse the idea of the primacy of a free market.  
Throughout the 1990s, a series of corporate planning scenario sessions were organised by 
the business sector, the first of these was the Nedcor/Old Mutual “Prospects for a 
successful transition”. Between 1991 and 1992 about over 4500 carefully selected South 
Africans from various societal backgrounds including the ANC had attended sessions 
proposing the direction to be taken by democratic South Africa.104The proliferation of more 
scenarios and documents saw similar initiatives such as the “Sanlam Platform for 
investment”, the “Mont Fleur Scenarios” as well as the presentation of “Economic Options 
for South Africa” being promoted by the South African Chamber of Business with the aim of 
convincing the ANC to accept neoliberal proposals.  
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In 1994 key ANC and government leaders such as Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki, Trevor 
Manuel and Tito Mboweni, met with the Brenthurst Group –a big business corporate and 
finance collective- led by Anglo American magnate Harry Oppenheimer. The purpose of this 
meeting was to secure assurance that the government would endorse the vision presented 
by them and that the ANC would not promote nationalisation as endorsed by its allies in the 
SACP and COSATU.105 After this ideological bombardment the thinking in the ANC and 
government began to change, this culminated in an announcement in February 1996 by 
Thabo Mbeki that a new strategy would be followed, thus foregrounding the ultimate 
adoption of GEAR.106  
CONCLUSION:  
This chapter has attempted to give an overview of the global political economic context 
within which South Africa began to align itself with neoliberal thinking. It has critically traced 
the rise of neoliberalism globally and argued that this rise was precipitated by the declining 
fortunes for capital accumulation both globally as well as domestically. This Chapter has also 
attempted to locate the impact of neoliberalism on African continent. In this regard it has 
been argued that the rise of neoliberalism has had an adverse l impact on the African 
continent due to the restrictive social policies and excessive promotion of private market 
interests as embodied by the Washington Consensus. Consequently, the adoption of GEAR 
was foregrounded by incessant efforts by the South African big business sector in 
partnership with its international counterparts and international financial institutions to 
exert pressure on the ANC and its key government leaders to accept neoliberal proposals 
which would ultimately shape the economic policy direction of post-apartheid South Africa. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
A SHIFT IN GEAR EMBRACING THE MARKET 
INTRODUCTION: 
With the certainty of democratic governance looming largely over South Africa’s political 
landscape in the early 1990’s, the National Party acceded to negotiations with the ANC, 
albeit reluctantly.107 Of much significance to the negotiation agendas of both political 
protagonists, was the nature and shape the political economy would assume in a 
democratic dispensation. Prior to his release -and as if to quell any doubts about his 
commitment to the Freedom Charter-Nelson Mandela issued a rather decisive statement of 
intent with regard to the ANC’s economic demands and post-liberation expectations. Nelson 
Mandela stated that:  
“The nationalisation of the mines, banks and monopoly industries is the policy of the 
ANC, and the change or modification of our views in this regard is inconceivable. 
Black economic empowerment is a goal we fully support and encourage, but in our 
situation state control of certain sectors of the economy is unavoidable”.108 
Despite this statement, the ANC approached the negotiation table with no notable coherent 
economic policy position it could articulate from the outset.109 Nevertheless, at this point, 
the desired economic policy trajectory emanating from the ANC and its alliance seemed 
unequivocally clear. In keeping with its pursuit of the Freedom Charter objectives, the ANC 
set about conceptualising a macro-policy framework which would best articulate how the 
objectives of it Freedom Charter vision would be achieved.  Leading up to the elections in 
1994, the ANC undertook a wide consultation process with its alliance partners and public at 
large, a process which culminated in the articulation of Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP) base document, which would form the economic policy outlook that the 
ANC would carry into government.  
The aim of this chapter is to illustrate the factors which caused the ANC to deviate from its 
historical Freedom charter vision, which envisaged a state led developmental post liberation 
political economy which prioritised the pursuit of redistribution as a means for growth. This 
Chapter will consequently argue that the adoption of GEAR during the transition from 
apartheid to democracy was essentially an economic policy alignment with neoliberalism. 
GEAR would prioritise free market neoliberal reforms as a primary means to achieve the 
transformation. Further, GEAR was a result of a deliberate economic policy outcome which 
was crafted unilaterally by key decision makers in the ANC who had bought into the 
neoliberal assumption that development would occur after growth had been attained.  
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This chapter is divided into five sections; the first section highlights the beginning of the free 
market ideological assault by domestic and international capital, on the ANC’s Freedom 
Charter based, interventionist developmental economic vision. The argument made in this 
section is that the ideological assault was consolidated in Davos, when Nelson Mandela was 
finally convinced to dispense with the idea of a state led developmental economy for post-
apartheid South Africa. This is a crucial moment in the ANC as it foregrounds the shift 
towards embracing free market neoliberal reforms.  
The second section illustrates the beginning stages of the ANC backtracking on the freedom 
charter vision, despite comprehensive alternative developmental proposals presented by 
the Macro Economic Research Group (MERG). What this illustrates is the manner in which 
key economic decision makers in the ANC began accepting the possibility of neoliberal 
reforms as reference to terms such as nationalisation were expunged from official policy 
documentation. The argument made in this section is that the ANC began to position itself 
as a trusted ally of the global neoliberal reform agenda.  
In the third section this I analyse the events which ultimately led to the ANC government’s 
complete acceptance of neoliberal reforms. Of significance in this section is the internal 
political battle between the ANC and its allies, who attempt to resist what they recognised 
as the ANC’s shift towards embracing free market neoliberal reforms. This section ultimately 
argues that the ANC became persistent in its pursuit of free market neoliberal reforms to 
the extent that it would openly reject political counsel from its close political allies.    
The fourth section analyses the adoption of the Growth Employment and Redistribution 
Strategy (GEAR), which consolidated the ANC government’s alignment with free market 
neoliberal reforms. This section illustrates the highly centralised and elite driven nature of 
the crafting and ultimate adoption of the GEAR strategy.  It also illustrates the neoliberal 
assumptions made by the GEAR strategy and argues that GEAR was a stark deviation from 
the Freedom charter inspired state led developmental vision. 
In the final section I analyse the reasons why the shift towards GEAR occurred. This is 
important in that it demonstrates the convergence between old and new elites whose 
interests coalesce in the adoption of GEAR. The principal argument made in this section is 
that the shift towards free market neoliberal reform as evidenced by the adoption of GEAR 
was a conscious and deliberate manoeuvre by the elite in the ANC who acted unilaterally 
and had bought into the ideas of neoliberal reforms.  
THE ANC’s IDEOLOGICAL BATTLE FOR TRANSFORMATION: THE DAVOS MOMENT 
Many years after its formation in 1912 the  ANC arrived at a point which saw it  align  its 
economic thinking with the Freedom Charter of 1955, which asserted a redistributive state 
led approach in terms of dealing with South Africa’s economic transformation question. This 
sentiment had also been confirmed by the ANC’s Harare conference in April of the year 
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1990, wherein the ANC had tabled its economic views.110 This stance by the ANC would 
invoke resistance by the South African business establishment as well as the Nationalist 
Party regime. This saw the likes of Thabo Mbeki assume a prominent role in positioning the 
ANC as rational and in touch with South Africa’s economic reality, as it attempted to assuage 
the white business elite.111   
Thabo Mbeki brooked a significant amount of criticism for this role from some of his 
comrades on the left of the political spectrum, who perceived him as collaborating with the 
enemy. Ultimately the end of the cold war made the ANC painfully aware of the fact that 
the road to transition would not be simple and/or straightforward. Yet, even at this point in 
its 1990 Harare Declaration, the ANC maintained that a significant degree of state 
intervention remained desirable in order to meaningfully dismantle the pernicious socio-
economic legacy of apartheid. 112 
After the ANC’s unbanning, Nelson Mandela would continue to vociferously assert that the 
ANC’s political economic trajectory would encompass extensive state intervention. He 
would even cite the example of what countries such as Britain, Germany and Japan had 
done by harnessing state-owned industry to reconstruct their economies.113 However, this 
economic vision would not go unchallenged. Economists such as Niccoli Nattrass criticised 
the ANC’s economic vision, citing that it was vague and that it did not provide sufficient 
detail. She further asserted that the major problem in South Africa was the drying up of 
private investment and that what government needed to do was to forge policies which 
would stabilise the macro- economic environment and thus encourage investor 
confidence.114 Further, resistance of the ANC’s economic vision came from the established 
big business sector, mainstream economists and the media, who cited that it bore socialist 
undertones and that it was nothing but macroeconomic populism aimed at appeasing the 
various constituencies within the ANC.115 They maintained their charge that the ANC was 
proposing “a state spending spree geared towards distribution would overheat the 
economy, and bog it down in a morass of foreign exchange shortages, currency 
devaluations, rampant inflations, severe indebtedness and cuts in real wages”.116 
It was not until February of the year 1992 when he attended the World Economic Forum in 
Davos Switzerland, that Nelson Mandela was persuaded to dispense with the idea of 
extensive state intervention and ownership or nationalisation. The Dutch minister whilst 
sympathetic to his nationalisation argument hastened to point out how significantly 
intertwined or interdependent economies were now due to the process of globalisation; 
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and that no economy could exist independently from other countries. 117 It was the leaders 
from China and Vietnam who ultimately seemed to hold sway in convincing Nelson Mandela 
that nationalisation was no longer a viable political economic pursuit, especially in a post-
Cold War context that was without the political-economic and ideological influence of the 
Soviet Union, which had all but collapsed.118  
Moreover, the collapse of the Soviet Union had exposed an intellectual vacuum on the 
socialist left which seemed to lack the requisite preparedness to conceptually grapple with a 
post Soviet Union global political economy. This created fertile intellectual ground for the 
triumph of neoliberalism, which hastened to assert that no alternative to the neoliberal 
paradigm was possible.119 After vociferous debate and discussion within the ANC and 
between the ANC and its South African Communist (SACP) allies, Nelson Mandela and Thabo 
Mbeki had succeeded in influencing the ANC to dispense with nationalisation from all of its 
policy documents.120 
THE TRIUMPH OF ORTHODOX ECONOMICS: 
The disappearance of nationalisation from the ANC’s policy documents was indicative of the 
beginning of a shift away from its historical economic vision which saw state intervention 
and thus redistribution as a pivotal pillar towards achieving transformation. However, this 
change in economic direction did not occur without contestation from the ANC’s left leaning 
allies. In November 1991 the Congress Alliance commissioned and launched the Macro 
Economic Research Group (MERG) with the assistance of the Canadian International 
Development Research Centre.121 The aim of the MERG research was to counter the market 
driven proposals which were used to sway ANC leaders such as Nelson Mandela. In this 
regard, the MERG strategy would place strong emphasis on the idea of growth through 
redistribution.122 
The vision proposed by the MERG strategy would see a strong private sector and public 
sector cooperation. This would unfold along two phases, the first phase envisaged by the 
MERG strategy would entail a public investment led phase from the period 1993 to 1999. 
According to the MERG strategy it was envisaged that there would significant state 
investment in social and physical infrastructure, i.e. housing, education, health, 
electrification and road development. This would account for over 50% of growth in the first 
phase.123 This would be followed by a second sustained growth phase, with a predicted 5% 
annual growth by 2004 and the creation of 300 000 new jobs per annum. 124  
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Further, the state would “apply a strategic mix of incentive and regulations to improve 
industrial performance and exercise more control of Reserve Bank”.125 The pro market 
proposals made by international financial institutions and the Nationalist Party were 
deemed as characteristically anti-labour; and thus unsuitable for the structure of what 
would be a post-apartheid South African economy. The proposals made by the MERG 
strategy were aimed at creating a more egalitarian political-economy environment in post-
apartheid South Africa.   
The International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank as well as the South African 
business elite continued to exert pressure on the ANC government in waiting and its core 
leadership structures. Key leaders such as Trevor Manual and Tito Mboweni were targeted 
for training in orthodox international economics, as if to ensure that any notion of growth 
through redistribution would be completely abandoned. White business retaliated to the 
MERG report by labelling it “macroeconomic populism” and a “dangerous fantasy”.126  
The pressure finally brought to bear when the ANC leadership agreed to and signed an 
$850-million IMF Compensatory and Contingency financing Facility. This was a financing 
facility extended to South Africa to assist South Africa with servicing its balance of 
payments. However, this would occur along neoliberal dictates imposed as conditions to the 
finance facility.127 Some ANC leaders described this apparent shift as somewhat inevitable in 
a post-cold war new global economic order; Mac Maharaj stated that “there were no 
examples to learn from or use as a guide…we could not go it alone. Countries that did, such 
as Sweden, had the space to do so with the Cold War still raging and the world being 
bipolar. The ANC came to power at the end of the Cold War in a unipolar world. We had no 
room to manoeuvre.” 128 
During this time, contexts such as Cuba, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe upon which 
the ANC government would have based its economic decisions were in crisis. This made the 
ANC somewhat risk averse as it deemed that continuing in what it had initially envisaged 
would lead to isolation in a global economic context dominated by the triumph of 
Neoliberalism. Jeremy Cronin, a leader in the ANC’s Congress Alliance explained that: “The 
triumph of neo-liberalism was at its Zenith in the early 1990s…The core aspects of the neo-
liberal paradigm became very influential in government circles and leading parts of the 
ANC”.129 Confronted with the prevailing global political economy current in neoliberalism, 
the ANC began an endeavour to position itself as a capable African government that could 
preside over policies that were palatable to a dominant international economic paradigm.  
CONSTRAINTS ON DEVELOPMENT: EMBRACING THE MARKET  
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Notwithstanding the domestic and external pressure on the ANC and the subsequent shift in 
economic thinking that had occurred amongst its key leaders. The ANC’s alliance partners 
(COSATU and the SACP), along with other ANC leaders who were on the left of the political 
spectrum remained resolute about the developmental economic vision they sought to 
realise in post-apartheid South Africa. The ANC and its alliance partners had reached a 
general political consensus to cooperate in terms of formulating economic policy. In 
particular, the alliance participated in formulating the ANC’s “Recommendations on Post-
Apartheid Economic Policy” and subsequently the document “Ready to Govern”. Both these 
documents enunciated a developmental perspective that would underpin the economic 
policy of a post-apartheid South African state. The stance enunciated in the ANC’s 
“Recommendations on Post-Apartheid Economic Policy” document was informed by a 
reading of the obtaining socio-economic realities which characterised South Africa, which it 
viewed as a reflection of apartheid distortions.130 
To this end, the document concluded that the obtaining economic policy reality in South 
Africa not only failed to meet the basic needs of the mass population of the country, also, 
the state and capital strategies that were in place were unlikely to result in the alleviation of 
poverty and mass depravation.131 The document also argued in favour of a developmental 
state, to this end, they specifically argued that “within the context of a mixed economy, the 
democratic non-racial state would assume the leading role in the reconstruction of the 
economy in order to facilitate the realisation of its developmental objectives”. 132 In addition 
Lehloesa helps us understand that:  
“The document proposed that reconstruction would be financed through domestic 
savings. It also proposed an increase in taxation for companies, the regulation of 
capital markets and the retention of exchange controls. In addition it, it stated that 
foreign investment would be directed for the purposes of employment creation. 
Further, it envisaged the development of a new industrial strategy which would be 
capable of meeting the basic needs of the people.”133  
The “Ready to Govern” document also committed itself to eliminating poverty, promoting 
democratisation, encouraging the redistribution of income as well as initiating growth and 
development.134 These were economic principles that were firmly in line with the vision 
enunciated by the Freedom Charter.  
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Thus, the scene was set for the emergence of the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP). In 1993 the National Union of Mineworkers-an affiliate of COSATU- 
initiated a debate in the tripartite alliance around the “Reconstruction Accord”. The Accord 
was subsequently redrafted and submitted to the ANC’s 1994 Conference on Reconstruction 
and Strategy for the purposes of discussion. The final outcome was a Conference resolution 
to adopt the Reconstruction and Development programme (RDP), which it would utilise as 
its manifesto for the general elections in 1994.135 COSATU’s support of the ANC’s election 
campaign was aimed at ensuring that once in government; the ANC would pursue the 
implementation of pro-labour policies. Thus, COSATU’s support proved critical for the ANC 
as it secured an emphatic electoral victory in 1994.136 
The political significance of this process cannot be overstated. The adoption of the RDP was 
preceded by a series of workshops and consultations, which also included another ally of 
the ANC, in the South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO) a Civil Society formation, 
thus strengthening the notion of “people-driven” development. 137 In this regard, SANCO 
emphasised that “People-driven development, is more than communities simply agreeing to 
projects. It means they must take an active part in determining the very nature of the 
project, in designing it, and even in organising the construction work”.138 Politically, this 
‘bottom-up’ approach signalled the centrality of inclusion and consultation in the ANC’s 
economic policy formulation approach. As a result, the RDP enjoyed wide support as also 
evidenced in the ANC’s election campaign, in which People’s Forums were convened, where 
people discussed and endorsed the RDP. 139  
At the centre of the RDP’s vision, were the principles of democratisation, meeting basic 
needs, the development of human and economic resources and the management and 
monitoring of reconstruction and development.  The RDP contended the apartheid had 
denied the majority black population basic access to services such as health, electricity, 
housing, water and education. Further, it contended that the National Party had 
restructured and privatised the economy, a move which had the devastating impacts of 
rising poverty, unemployment and inequality.  
The centrality of the role of the state was also emphasised by the RDP, which envisaged that 
the state would lead the realisation of reconstruction and development through the building 
of infrastructure. This would subsequently lead to the link between growth, reconstruction 
and development. Further, the RDP envisaged that growth would be realised through the 
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significant promotion of exports.140 Analysts such as Bill Freund argued that the proposals of 
the RDP were balanced and informed by South Africa’s socio-economic reality; he concluded 
that the RDP represented “a realistic balance between private opportunity and State 
regulation as the means through which change must occur. It is in line with international 
trends and does not place unrealistic hopes on an all-benevolent state”. 141 
However, other analysts argued that whilst the RDP was laudable, it suffered a scarcity in 
detail. For example, Philip Dexter argued that the RDP was weak on its means of 
implementation and cautioned that it was open to interpretation by various stakeholders 
and their interests. In defence of the RDP the alliance partners argued that the attacks on 
the RDP were informed by interested class bias. To this end, they stated that  
“Our class opponents have failed to defeat us. They have now been forced back into 
working within our Reconstruction and Development Programme. But they are doing 
so with their own agenda- to dilute, to subvert and generally to frustrate our 
attempts to empower the majority of South Africans.”142  
After the 1994 election, the ANC set about implementing the RDP. Comprehensive 
structures were put in place towards this end. These included an RDP office which would 
see to it that RDP programmes were initiated, well -coordinated and managed with the 
relevant line departments. A special RDP fund was set up and the former Secretary General 
of COSATU. Jay Naidoo was appointed as Minister without Portfolio to run the RDP office.143 
The National Institute of Economic Policy (NIEP) was tasked with projecting the costs of the 
RDP. The NIEP proposed that the RDP should be funded through efficient tax collection, 
private sector contributions, and contributions by state owned entities. It estimated that the 
implementation of the RDP would cost the government R135 million.144 
In the initial phases of RDP programme implementation, there seemed to be some traction 
which registered critical social gains. The government ensured the implementation of a 
comprehensive welfare system, which saw the provision of free healthcare programmes for 
pregnant women and young children, school feeding schemes were also rolled out to the 
benefit of between 3, 5 to 5 million children. 145 Further, access to water and sanitation, 
energy and electrification, education and social welfare was expanded. For instance, a 
number of grants were established with regard to social welfare, such as the Child Support 
Grant, Old Age Pension and the Disability Grant to name but a few. 146 
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The RDP was soon plagued by incapacity and subsequent implementation problems, which 
resulted in backlogs in the provision of basic services. It has also been argued in some 
quarters that the problem with the RDP was that it was too broadly formulated and did not 
spell out a detailed programme in relation to its main aims.147 Scholars such as Patrick Bond 
contend that the RDP was stifled and consequently was “fatally undermined by timid 
politicians, hostile bureaucrats and unreliable private sector partners”.148   
In September 1994, the ANC led government released the RDP White Paper; this paper 
signalled a break with the developmental objectives which had hitherto informed the 
RDP.149 In contrast to the RDP base document, the RDP White Paper began to emphasise the 
need to ensure fiscal prudence as well as the need to redefine the role of government and 
the public sector. To this end it argued that the government had to reduce expenditure, 
further, it emphasised ‘growth and development’ in direct contrast with the RDP base 
document which had emphasised ‘development with growth’. This sparked criticism from 
analyst like Ben Fine who argued that the “RDP was being diminished in its content and the 
means to implement it”.150 This change culminated in the closure of the RDP Office in March 
1996. The government justified this closure by arguing that the relevant Ministries were 
able to integrate reconstruction and development into their respective programmes, 
making the RDP office superfluous. Against this backdrop, the RDP programmes experienced 
severe funding constraints. The ANC highlighted that it had inherited a nearly bankrupt 
State, due to the apartheid regime’s mismanagement of the state as it attempted to prolong 
it hold on power, thus accumulating high levels of state debt.  
The ANC government emphasised that high levels of state debt had brought pressure to 
bear. In light of this, the ANC government cautioned that “it is important to note that costs 
will continue to increase and accelerate as a percentage of the GDP unless the deficit is 
brought down to sustainable levels”.151  This elicited criticism from the ANC Alliance 
partners. Blade Nzimande and Jeremy Cronin in particular criticised this argument on the 
basis that it had introduced a ‘balancing act’.  
The SACP in particular, cautioned against an economic restructuring that advocated for the 
subordination of workers to the interests of capital.152 On the other hand, a coalition of big 
business in South Africa, under the Growth For All Strategy of the South African Foundation, 
continued to argue for a more prominent role for markets in economic growth, fiscal 
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discipline, consistency in economic policy, promotion of investor confidence as well as the 
need for the government to act emphatically and decisively with regards to economic policy 
implementation.  
THE ADOPTION OF GEAR 
In 1996 South Africa experienced a currency crisis. This resulted in a significant loss in value 
in the domestic currency. In February 1996, the value of the South African rand plummeted 
significantly.153 By May 1996, the Rand’s value had fallen by per cent against the American 
dollar. The Financial Mail reported that the consumer price index had risen by 6.3% per cent 
and that banks had increased their prime lending rates to over 13% per cent. The crash of 
the Rand was subsequently interpreted by some analysts and economists alike as a signal 
that investors were not happy with the South African macroeconomic policy environment. 
Against this backdrop, the SACP cautioned that the Rand’s loss of value was “being used as 
an opportunity to make all kinds of ideological pronouncements”.154 
The warning issued by the SACP fell on deaf ears, a panic stricken ANC government 
responded to the currency crisis by unveiling the Growth Employment and Redistribution 
(GEAR) macro-economic strategy in June 1996.155 The GEAR would now inform the direction 
of South Africa’s macroeconomic direction environment going forward. Unlike the widely 
consultative and inclusive nature of the RDP, the drafting of the GEAR was undertaken by a 
carefully selected team comprised of senior bureaucrats, academics international and local, 
as well policy makers from the IMF and World Bank.  
The key South African Government departments which were involved in the drafting of the 
GEAR were the Departments of Finance, Trade and Industry and Labour. 156 One of the 
drafters of the GEAR, a senior official in the Department of Trade and Industry, stated that 
the consultations in the drafting of the GEAR occurred at a “high level” within government 
and were confidential. Another member of the drafting team, who initially represented the 
World Bank and then later the Department of Finance, confirmed that the input of 
government departments in the drafting of the GEAR strategy was substantial. Members of 
the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) as well as the Development Bank of Southern Africa 
(DBSA) were also included in the drafting process. 157 
Two main reasons were given by the drafting team for the lack of wider consultation and 
inclusion in the drafting of the GEAR strategy. The first was the fact that the GEAR document 
had to be produced in a short space of time. The second was that the drafters were 
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sceptical about the about the quality of inputs emanating from civil society.158 In this regard, 
they suggested that past attempts at consultation with partners such as civil society 
demonstrated a lack of coherence on the part of civil society’s approach to macroeconomic 
policy, thus weakening their policy “voice” on economic issues. However, members of the 
drafting team unanimously acknowledged that there perhaps was a need to for wider 
consultation and inclusion. However, this was “impossible” as “the currency was in free fall 
and consultations would have delayed the publication of GEAR for too long”.159 
Another factor that was highlighted as a justification against inclusivity was the sensitive 
nature of some of the measures proposed by the document. It was suggested that items 
such as exchange controls warranted non-disclosure. One of the authors went as far as 
stating that; “further exchange controls contained in the report were very sensitive and 
could not be broadcast before the plan was made public”.160 Dangor also highlights that an 
academic on the drafting team suggested that “when it comes to participation in 
macroeconomic policy development, it is important to distinguish between the issues that 
demand secrecy and those that can be and should be subjected to a participatory policy 
making process”.161 Thus the value of secrecy was upheld as crucial to the drafting process 
of the GEAR strategy. Politically, this marked a stark deviation from the consultation and 
inclusivity which had previously been the hallmark of the ANC’s economic policy formulation 
approach. Then Finance Minister Trevor Manuel sounded the death knell on inclusive 
economic policy formulation within the ANC and Alliance, when he declared the GEAR 
strategy ‘non-negotiable’.162 
In terms of its policy propositions, the GEAR strategy would also differ from its RDP base 
document predecessor. In this instance, the GEAR strategy shifted the emphasis from what 
had previously been a secondary consideration, to a primary consideration. The GEAR 
strategy placed macroeconomic reform at the forefront of South Africa’s macroeconomic 
policy agenda and development subsequently became a secondary consideration.163 
The GEAR strategy proposed that it would create a competitive fast growing economy, with 
its architects arguing that a growth rate of 3%, the rate at which South Africa was growing 
was unsustainable. GEAR predicted that it would thus be able to facilitate a growth rate of 
6% by the year 2000 and create 400 000 jobs per annum by the same year. This it proposed 
would occur through the “promotion of non-gold exports, the expansion of private 
investment, liberalisation and the introduction of a flexible labour market”.164  
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GEAR also sought to reduce Government spending relative to GDP, to introduce a more 
flexible labour market and to phase out exchange controls in a manner in which it argued 
would be prudent. At its core, the GEAR strategy was concerned with reducing the budget 
deficit, which it viewed as means to rectify economic mismanagement by the National Party 
regime. GEAR -perhaps somewhat paradoxically- was also positioned as a vehicle to realise 
the RDP. Thabo Mbeki pronounced that “this policy is the central compass which will guide 
all other sectoral growth and development programmes of the government aimed at 
achieving the objectives of the RDP”.165 Analysts such as Asghar Adelzadeh of the NIEP, 
questioned GEAR’s proposals and projections and described them as arbitrary. 
In this regard Adelzadeh argued that the World Bank viewed a 12 per cent deficit as still 
sustainable and that South Africa had not experienced uncontrollable inflation in the last 30 
years at the time. 166 Further, Adelzadeh was critical of GEAR’s proposal at raising the 
exports GDP ratio to 25 per cent, citing that it was higher than in OECD and East Asian 
countries. He also expressed concern that the growth targets of GEAR hinged on the 
moderation of wages and the stimulation of private investment, Adelzadeh concluded that 
“the proposed framework and policy scenarios represented an adoption of the essential 
tenets policy recommendations of the neoliberal framework advocated by the IMF in its 
structural adjustment programmes”. 167 Therefore, not only did the GEAR strategy represent 
a stark deviation from the ANC’s culture of inclusivity on the political level, economically, it 
signalled an unquestionable move away from the developmental growth through 
redistribution vision which was envisaged by the ANC, as enunciated by the Freedom 
Charter and subsequently the RDP base document.  
At this juncture it was all too clear that the ANC had abandoned its vision which envisaged 
that the transformation of post-apartheid South Africa would occur along a macroeconomic 
framework –and concomitant policy programmes- predicated on development and 
redistribution as its core pillars. The more vexed discussion unfolds around the reason or 
reasons that the ANC did so.  
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WHY GEAR? 
Much has been said and written in attempting to answer the question or questions around 
why the shift to GEAR occurred. For example, scholars of South Africa’s political economy of 
transition, such as Adam Habib, highlight two broad explanations in the mainstream 
discourse. One argument, from more of a left leaning perspective suggests that ANC elites 
‘sold out’. The other line of argument albeit on the right of the political spectrum, argues 
that the ANC elites had finally seen the light and had somewhat come to their senses. Habib 
dismisses both sides of this argument as ‘deficient’, as they suggest homogeneity amongst 
actors, suggesting that homogeneity could not have existed in a context with a high 
turnover of elites. Further, such an argument overemphasises the role of elites. 168 
Habib also highlights the argument which suggests that there were weak links between 
those who were tasked with ushering in a macroeconomic policy which reflected the ANC’s 
developmental desires and the ANC decision makers at the time, thus this is how the 
developmental vision was lost. Habib also dismisses this argument as oversimplifying the 
policy decision making process taken by the ANC leadership.169 
Scholars such as Patrick Bond on the other hand, suggest that political timidity thwarted the 
advancement of a viable developmental post-apartheid macroeconomic vision.170 Other 
explanations offered by the likes of Hein Marais allude to the structural constraints of 
‘realpolitik’ which the ANC had to deal with, given the changes occurring in the global 
political economic arena. These changes it is suggested resulted in the ANC’s inability to 
follow through on its Freedom Charter and RDP base document vision for a post-apartheid 
South Africa.171 
To the extent that macroeconomics became a key site for contestation during South Africa’s 
transition period from apartheid to democracy, the ANC conceded the contest to 
established market interests. Therefore, the decision to adopt GEAR can be characterised as 
embodying a set of layered and yet interconnected political and economic factors. Firstly, it 
reflected what could somewhat be seen as an assertion of elite class power, which secured 
a convergence between old and new elites. Secondly, GEAR’s adoption demonstrated the 
strength of established old South African capital (which the ANC may or may not have 
underestimated). In this regard Maganya notes that:  
“One aspect of policy-making which makes South Africa stand out from many other 
African countries is the role of local capital. This particular aspect of South Africa’s 
political-economy will be important when considering the reasons behind the 
adoption of a typical neo-liberal package in 1996. The presence of a strong national 
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capitalist class, albeit one dominated by one race (whites), has been a critical factor 
in policy formulation”.172   
GEAR resulted in the consolidation of old domestic capitalist class interests in the 
democratic dispensation thus cementing the endorsement of free market principles or the 
primacy of the market as a means through which transformation goals would be realised.  
Lastly, and more importantly, the adoption of GEAR can be seen as a deliberate policy 
choice by the new elite (ANC leadership), thus cementing the convergence between old and 
new capitalist class interests. To this end, GEAR demonstrated a willingness by the ANC elite 
to accept free market ideas as a means to achieve its transformation goals. Key figures in 
the ANC government had bought into the promises of neoliberalism, between 1994 and 
2001 they had been seduced into occupying important international positions as board of 
governors in the IMF and World Bank.173  In South Africa the result became a rapid 
assimilation of the new elite into participating in the prevailing capitalist modes of 
production through black empowerment schemes, which were characterised by the 
dominance of the Minerals and Energy Complex (MEC) as well as the financial sector.174 Ben 
Fine, a leading analyst on South Africa’s economy, characterises the Minerals and Energy 
Complex as “the mining and energy sectors and a number of associated sub-sectors of 
manufacturing, which have constituted and continue to constitute the core site of 
accumulation in the South African economy”.175 These characteristics have shaped much of 
South Africa’s post- apartheid political economy.   
The elite bias in GEAR’s adoption further reinforced its character as an alignment with the 
dominant neoliberal political economy paradigm. In this regard, David Harvey’s observations 
are rather instructive when he notes that neoliberalism seeks to “re-establish the conditions 
for capital accumulation”.176  Further, it aims to create the power of new economic elites.177  
GEAR emerged against a backdrop of constrained capital accumulation which had laid the 
foundation for neoliberal reforms in the 1980s through the National Party’s Normative 
Economic Model policy proposal. GEAR enjoyed significant support from both domestic and 
international capital.  Ultimately, GEAR became a more palatable alternative for the ANC 
elites for whom the exigencies of power deemed the Freedom Charter’s developmental 
vision unworkable in an increasingly globalised neoliberal global order.178   
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The ANC recognised that it would have to begin conversing with the erstwhile business 
sector which could not be ignored given the recognition of the locus of real economic 
power. In this regard Thabo Mbeki called for an abandonment of the wish for the total 
defeat of and suppression of the class forces responsible for apartheid”. Instead, he called 
for the need for “a dialectical relationship with private capital as a social partner for 
development and social progress”. 179 At this point, the priority for the ANC lay more with 
winning over the confidence of the business establishment than fulfilling the demands and 
needs of its constituency.180 
With regard to the role of elites in the adoption of GEAR, Habib correctly argues that “the 
balance of power in both the global and national arenas was unfavourable to poor and 
marginalised citizens, and as a result, state elites were conditioned to make the choices that 
they did”.181 Whilst this may have been the case, this explanation does not go far enough 
and runs the risk of rendering state elites as uncritical actors who can subsequently end up 
being absolved from the consequences their actions. It also overlooks the fact that GEAR 
emerged as a deliberate policy outcome crafted by policy actors who were all too aware of 
and reconciled to their macroeconomic policy actions. This is underscored by the then 
Mbeki administration policy chief, Joel Netshitenzhe, who stated that “GEAR was a 
structural adjustment policy, self-imposed, to stabilise the macroeconomic situation, to deal 
with the realities of an unmanageable budget deficit, high interest rates and weak local and 
foreign investor confidence”. 182  The role of elite action cannot be downplayed or 
overlooked when considering the adoption of GEAR. It proved to be amongst the key drivers 
of GEAR’s ultimate endorsement.  
CONCLUSION:  
The aim of this chapter was to illustrate how the ANC effectively deviated from its historical 
vision for a transformed post-apartheid political economy, as embodied by the Freedom 
Charter. The ANC had predicated its goals for transforming democratic South Africa on a 
developmental political economy premise, which envisaged that the State would be a 
primary actor in presiding over a primarily redistributive macroeconomic regime, which 
would then in turn facilitate economic growth. What occurred instead was a convergence 
with neoliberalism and the cementing of the ideas of the free market as a primary means 
through which South Africa’s first democratically elected government would pursue its post-
apartheid transformation goals, as reflected by the adoption of GEAR. The adoption of GEAR 
occurred in spite of a significant challenge from the ANC, allies who had presented the 
proposals made by MERG and the RDP base document as a counterweight to the neoliberal 
proposals made by GEAR; and preferred by the domestic and international business elite. 
Further, the adoption of GEAR demonstrated the strength of established capitalist interest 
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in South Africa, which was able to consolidate its interests in a democratic South Africa at 
the expense of the ANC’s historical developmental vision, as well as secure a convergence 
with new capitalist elites. Most importantly, the adoption of GEAR occurred because of 
conscious and deliberate policy action by elite actors inside and outside of the ANC, who 
had come to accept that the markets would be the vehicle through which transformation 
would be pursued. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
GEAR IN ACTION: CONSEQUENCES FOR SOUTH AFRICA’S POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
TRANSITION 
INTRODUCTION:  
The adoption of GEAR proved to be a key historical moment in the ANC led government’s 
post-apartheid economic thinking and thus set the tone for how the South African Post-
apartheid state would arrange its economic policy orientation. GEAR’s adoption was the 
moment which outwardly symbolised democratic South Africa’s economic policy 
convergence with neoliberal thinking. Its assumptions would prove to be resilient in South 
Africa’s democratic dispensation as market led growth economic strategies would be 
entrenched.  
Thus far, under the chosen economic trajectory South Africa continues to battle with 
chronic rising poverty, unemployment and inequality, albeit whilst having demonstrated a 
few gains. Therefore this chapter aims to critically take stock of economic performance and 
planning in South Africa after apartheid, beginning with an assessment of GEAR. It will focus 
on some of the key features of the post-apartheid South African economy which emerged as 
a consequence of the GEAR strategy. It will argue that GEAR defined the parameters within 
which economic policy would unfold in post-apartheid South Africa; this has seen 
predominantly market led neoliberal reforms through a set of various macroeconomic 
policy interventions. The post-apartheid economy has hitherto been characterised by mixed 
fortunes coupled with persistent poverty, unemployment and inequality.  
This Chapter is divided into five sections; the first section outlines the shortcomings of the 
GEAR strategy. Despite limited gains, the GEAR strategy fell short of most of its targets and 
consequently did not yield the levels of growth and inclusive economic participation it had 
predicted. The key argument made in this section is that GEAR subordinated economic 
policy to free market priorities. This is important to note as it underscores how post-
apartheid South African economic policy affirmed the free market neoliberal reform agenda, 
which had been set in motion by international elite actors.  
In the second section the study illustrates the continuation of the assumptions made by 
GEAR through new sets of macroeconomic policy interventions. This is important because 
despite the recognition of GEAR’s short comings by the ANC government, the introduction 
of new economic policy frameworks do not lead to a fundamental rupture in economic 
policy orientation. The key argument made in this section is that new policy frameworks 
continued to prioritise market led neoliberal reforms which have reinforced socio economic 
imbalances in post-apartheid South Africa. 
The third section describes the role of the post-apartheid South African State in affirming 
neoliberal reforms, contrary to expectations that under neoliberalism state intervention is 
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at a minimum. It is critically illustrated that the South African post-apartheid state has been 
primarily concerned with controlling costs and less with acting as a developmental engine. 
Therefore I argue that, the relationship between the post-apartheid South African state and 
the market is one that has been mutually reinforcing.   
In the fourth section, I analyse one of the primary tools which were established as a means 
to drive the GEAR strategy, in Black Economic Empowerment (BEE). Instead of broadening 
black economic participation, BEE served a politically connected black minority.  Therefore, I 
argue that BEE consolidated the convergence between old and new elites in post-apartheid 
South Africa, consequently stunting the broad based transformation agenda.  
The last section illustrates the constraints on transformation in post-apartheid South Africa. 
On this basis it argues that the inability of the state to deliver services to the vulnerable 
section of the population has resulted in an erosion of confidence in the democratic state. 
This has culminated in high instances of violence as a means to register civic discontent, 
which has seen a concomitant retaliation with violence by the State. It remains to be seen as 
to whether or not the National Development Plan will charter an alternative developmental 
economic path for post-apartheid South Africa.   
GEAR FAILURE AND COMMITMENT TO MACROECONOMIC ORTHODOXY:  
Having inherited a brittle political-economy, the ANC led government’s introduction of GEAR 
brought about much needed stability to South Africa’s post-1994 political-economic outlook 
which resulted in prudent financial management by the post-apartheid South African state, 
this has been one of the key benefits of GEAR. In its twenty year democratic history the 
South African political economy has managed to register key gains, according to the 
Goldman Sachs “Two Decades of Freedom” report:  
“Macro fiscal and monetary balances have improved, Government debt costs have 
trended lower and foreign reserves have risen, over cost of capital has declined, 
corporate valuations have improved relative to peers, real asset ZAR returns have 
compared favourably, China and Africa trade rise has offset European trade decline, 
disposable income of South Africans has risen, the rise of the black middle class has 
led to a structural boost in spending, wage inflation and government grants have 
supported this trend and per unit labour productivity has improved”.183   
However, the South African economy would need much more than macroeconomic and 
fiscal rectitude in order to deliver on the government’s transformation vision. At its launch 
GEAR had promised a 6% economic growth rate and the creation of 400 000 jobs per 
annum.184 However, by 2001, five years since its inception, GEAR had only managed a 2.7% 
economic growth rate whilst employment shrank by 3%, resulting in a loss of one million 
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jobs. The same period saw a reduction in welfare and health spending, resulting in increased 
instances of marginalisation and social decline. 185  In this instance, welfare spending 
decreased from 9.6% of the total budget in the 1998/1999 financial cycle to 9.3% in the 
2000/2001 financial cycle, whilst health spending saw a decrease from 12. 2% to 11.7%. The 
job losses occurred as a result of the introduction of labour saving technologies; which 
resulted in an increase in the practice of outsourcing and the market-led turn towards 
labour casualization and contract labour. Real government investment grew by a paltry 1.8% 
instead of the 7.1% growth rate which was anticipated, GEAR’s implementation also saw a 
sharp decrease in real private sector investment, which fell from 6.1% in 1996 to 0.7% in 
1998.186 The table below illustrates the performance of GEAR: 
Table 3.1: GEAR Prediction versus Actual Performance
187
 
Annual Growth 
Rates  
1996 1997 1998 1999 
Real GDP: 
GEAR Prediction 
 
Actual 
Performance 
 
 
3.5 
 
4.2 
 
2.9 
 
2.5 
 
3.8 
 
0.6 
 
4.9 
 
1.2 
Private 
investment: 
 
GEAR Prediction  
Actual 
Performance 
 
 
 
9.3 
 
6.1 
 
 
 
9.1 
 
4.7 
 
 
 
9.3 
 
-2.9 
 
 
 
13.9 
 
-4.4 
Real wage 
growth 
(Private):  
GEAR Prediction 
  
Actual 
Performance 
 
 
 
-0.5 
 
1.7 
 
 
 
1.0 
 
2.3 
 
 
 
1.0 
 
8.6 
 
 
 
1.0 
 
3.0 
Employment 
(non-
agricultural): 
GEAR Prediction 
 
Actual 
performance  
 
 
 
1.3 
 
-0.7 
 
 
 
3.0 
 
-1.7 
 
 
 
2.7 
 
-3.7 
 
 
 
3.5 
 
-3.2 
Conventional     
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deficit/GDP: 
 
GEAR Prediction 
 
Actual 
Performance 
 
 
-5.1 
 
-4.9 
 
 
-4.0 
 
-4.6 
 
 
-3.5 
 
-3.5 
 
 
-3.0 
 
-2.6 
 
GEAR’s firm commitment to economic orthodoxy had devastating consequences which 
resulted in severe constraints where the redistribution of income was concerned. Since 
GEAR set no redistributive targets. Those who were continuously afflicted by 
unemployment, growing inequality, social decline and a contagious disease burden, had no 
recourse to their worsening social plight.188 Further adverse consequences attributable to 
the introduction of GEAR were observable in the rate at which the South African economy 
was liberalised and integrated into the global economy as well as the extent which-what 
were considered-non-core state assets were sold privately. For example, the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) only expected South Africa to lower its tariffs over a period of 12 years 
for its textile and motor industry. Through the GEAR framework the South African 
government committed itself to lowering the said tariffs in only eight years. With respect to 
privatisation, then Minister of Public Enterprises Jeff Radebe publicly committed to 
completing the government’s privatisation programme by the year 2004.189  
The impact of the rate and extent to which the economy was liberalised, was that it brought 
about the acceptance that the markets would play a dominant role in setting prices and the 
allocation of finance. Further, it saw the increased free flow of capital across the border and 
permitted the exchange rate of the rand to be set in global currency markets. The surge in 
capital flows culminated in high rates of capital flight, money leaving the South African 
economy. As a result macroeconomic and financial instability set in which weakened the 
economy of overtime. Further, it did not lead to economic activity that would ensure 
economic growth in the long term, instead it led to increased imports, growth in private 
sector consumption and more money leaving the South African economy. The overall 
ramification has been the hindrance of the government’s ability to tackle rising 
unemployment and levels of inequality and increase economic development activity. 190 The 
extent and rate of liberalisation undertaken also saw some of the largest South African 
companies moving their primary listings to overseas. This subsequently resulted in an 
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upward spike in mergers and acquisition activity in the economy, which did not necessarily 
improve the productive capacity of the South African economy.191  
POLICY CONTINUITY AND IMPACT: ASGISA AND THE NEW GROWTH PATH 
By the early 2000s, it had dawned on the Architects of GEAR that GEAR was not living up to 
expectations, thus prompting a slight shift in thinking and approach. Then President Thabo 
Mbeki began articulating the idea of developmental state which would seek to bring about a 
more interventionist state and constrain the influence of the markets. However, despite this 
realisation the Mbeki administration vacillated, being critical of the markets yet reinforcing 
them in their policy action, a trait that some observers described as ‘talking left and walking 
right’.192  
In lamenting the status quo Thabo Mbeki noted what he termed the existence of ‘two 
nations’ with distinct economies within the geographic boundary of South Africa. In this 
regard Mbeki stated that:  
“We therefore make bold to say that South Africa is a country of two nations. One of 
these is white, relatively prosperous…it has ready access to a developed economic, 
physical, educational, communication and other infrastructure…The second and 
larger nation of South Africa is poor, with the worst affected being women in the 
rural areas, the black rural population in general and the disabled. This nation lives 
under conditions of a grossly underdeveloped economic, physical, communication 
and other infrastructure…”193  
Mbeki had accurately recognised that the persisting political economic malaise afflicted the 
majority of the population, who were historically marginalised by centuries of colonialism 
and later decades of apartheid. However, his administration’s insisted on macroeconomic 
orthodoxy. The challenges of employment creation, growing inequality, poverty and slow 
economic growth targets averaging only 3% in the first decade of democracy, prompted a 
policy shift. In 2005 the Mbeki administration introduced the Accelerated Shared Growth 
Initiative (ASGISA).  
ASGISA attempted to set the South African economy on a path that would see poverty and 
halved by the year 2014. In September 2005 the unemployment rate remained considerably 
high at a rate of 25%. ASGISA set itself a two phased growth rate target that would see and 
annual growth rate of 4.5% between 2005 and 2009 and a 6% GDP growth rate between 
2010 and 2014. Through ASGISA it was hoped that the facilitation of such growth rates 
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would result in the creation of more jobs.194 In an attempt to remedy the failures of GEAR 
the government sought to play a more active role in the economy, it would seek to do so 
through a vigorous infrastructure development programme. Through the ASGISA 
framework, government would increase public sector investment. The Medium Term 
Budget Policy Statement of October 2005 announced that “government and public 
enterprise expenditure for the period April 2005 and March 2008 is planned to be about 
R370 billion”.195 In this regard, the Extended Public Works Programme (EPWP) would be 
amongst a key set of interventions that would see “about 100 000 additional people in Jobs 
averaging six months in roads building and training”.196  In its macroeconomic proposition 
ASGISA reaffirmed a commitment to an inflation targeting regime, through which it aimed 
to realise the growth levels it projected for the economy. This commitment to inflation 
targeting mirrored what GEAR had sought to do previously to achieve the growth levels that 
it had projected.  
In 2009 the Economic Development Department (EDD) tabled a new macroeconomic 
framework in the New Growth Path (NGP). The rationale behind New Growth Path was to 
review the extent of unemployment and inequality, thus seeking to create employment 
opportunities and to overcome inequality and exclusion. Further, the New Growth Path 
accurately identified some of the key challenges of the GEAR era namely: that of jobless 
growth, which saw an overall economic growth rate between 1994 and 2008 of 4% (the 
same as other middle income countries) yield no returns in terms of employment creation, 
deep seated inequality with 40% of the country’s wealth concentrated in the hands of 10% 
of the population. This had consolidated South Africa’s status as the most unequal country 
in the world. The share of wages in the national income dropped from 50% in 1994 to just 
over 45% in 2009. Another disconcerting challenge was that of young people between the 
ages of 16 and 30 whose rate of unemployment registered at a staggering 40% in the first 
quarter of 2010.197 
Despite the recognition of these challenges the macroeconomic proposal tabled by the New 
Growth Path did not deviate much from those of GEAR. In this regard, the NGP proposed 
that:  
“the macroeconomic section of the package entails a careful balancing of more 
active monetary policy interventions to achieve growth and jobs targets, inter alia 
through a more competitive exchange rate and a lower cost of capital, with a more 
restrained fiscal stance and a reprioritisation of public spending to ensure 
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sustainability over time…In terms of the macroeconomic stance, for the foreseeable 
future the government will be guided by a loser monetary policy and a more 
restrictive fiscal policy backed by microeconomic measures to contain inflationary 
pressures and enhance competitiveness.”198  
The package proposed by the NGP entailed the following:   
“1. The monetary policy stance will continue to target low and stable inflation but 
will do more to support a more competitive exchange rate and reduced investment 
costs through lower real interest rates…2. Additional and larger purchases of foreign 
currency flowing into South Africa, as a result of foreign direct investment and 
portfolio inflows in order to counter appreciation of the rand as required…3. Greater 
restraint in fiscal policy to slow inflation despite easier monetary policy; A counter 
cyclical fiscal stance through the business cycle will manage demand in support of a 
more competitive currency while achieving critical public spending goals…4. 
Mobilisation of resources to finance growth path priorities, particularly jobs, skills 
and infrastructure; The new fiscal policy will require vigorous prioritisation and 
improved value for money, with reductions in less important areas while protecting 
priority public services.”199   
Inflation targeting, the prioritisation of foreign direct investment a restrictive fiscal stance 
and the curbing public spending proposed by the NGP’s macroeconomic package 
demonstrated a continuity from GEAR, despite having suggested otherwise.  
Amongst the notable areas which best depict the worsening plight of South Africa’s majority 
after apartheid is the labour market. The post-apartheid labour market has managed to 
reproduce and further entrench unequal power relations between labour and capital. This is 
demonstrated by increasing employer power, despite media reports to the contrary, which 
depict the post 1994 South African labour market as one which is predominantly rigid and in 
which workers are overprotected, overly unionised and poorly skilled, a depiction which 
affirms the neoliberal perspective.200  
South Africa’s official unemployment rate figure as at 2013 hovers at a high 25% rate, there 
has been much debate around why the unemployment figure has remained so high. The 
neoclassical orthodox explanation suggests that it is as a result of “the simultaneous 
existence of a skilled labour shortage and unskilled labour surplus”201. This argument seeks 
to suggest that skills development would be necessary in reducing unemployment, however, 
this argument has been deemed to be flawed by the suggestion that “even if more jobs 
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were created for skilled than unskilled people, it does not follow that increasing skill levels 
would in turn generate jobs”.202  Further, this argument misses the point about the 
unemployment crisis in South Africa in that it is fundamentally structural. 
In this regard three main reasons can be identified for South Africa’s unemployment crisis 
namely: Historically South Africa has experienced high unemployment, a sluggish growth 
rate and a declining labour intensity growth. The macroeconomic frameworks in place from 
GEAR, ASGISA right through to the New Growth Path have been unable to alter the South 
African economy’s dependence on the Minerals and Energy Complex (MEC). This has meant 
that the economy remains capital, rather than labour intensive with minimal capacity to 
absorb labour, even in instances of growth.  
The jobs that have been created have increasingly deteriorated in quality, with more 
casualised forms of employment becoming more common place in the labour market. 
Consequently, this has resulted in significant wage level deterioration, as workers are left 
vulnerable and exposed to the mechanism of sectoral determination which reinforces low 
wages.203 This has also reproduced the functional inequality between labour and capital and 
has seen it increase steadily; consequently the wage share of GDP has fallen from 50.1% in 
1995 to 44.5% in 2010. This has further entrenched South Africa’s status as the most 
unequal country in the world, which saw the Gini coefficient rise from 0.56 in 1995 to 0.63 
in 2009, surpassing that of Brazil.204  
THE ROLE OF THE DEMOCRATIC STATE AND A DEEPENING NEOLIBERALISM  
The post 94 South African variant of neoliberalism is particularly interesting to observe, 
where typically neoliberalism would result in the retreat of the state, this has not been the 
case in the South African context. Quite to the contrary the post 1994 South African 
neoliberal state has been what could be considered to be a strong state. In this regard its 
strength has been applied towards entrenching the political economy of neoliberalism.205 
South Africa’s ‘unique’ form of neoliberalism underscores the reality that:  
“Arguing that South Africa represents a case of deepening neoliberalism does not 
imply that all of its characteristics must be deduced from an initial blueprint; on the 
contrary, what is interesting is to analyse the particular form, contradictions and 
adaptations of neoliberalism in South Africa…”206  
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It is within this context that this research seeks to make the case for the social, economic 
and political reforms in democratic South Africa which it deems are characterised by 
neoliberalism. This is to suggest that rather than being antagonistic, the relation between 
the democratic South African State and the market has been one that is mutually 
reinforcing.  
One of the most notable areas in which the South African State has demonstrated 
formidable capacity is within the National Treasury (NT). The restructuring of the state 
under the guise of the notion of New Public Management (NPM) in the transition to 
democracy resulted in a National Treasury being the locus for the state’s macroeconomic 
orthodox policies. This was supported by an institutional architecture which included the 
South African Revenue Services (SARS), The Presidency as well the positioning of the South 
African Reserve Bank (SARB) outside of the purview of political oversight.  
What had initially begun as a means to stabilise the political economy from the decline 
inherited from the Apartheid state, culminated in the consolidation of orthodox economic 
interventions and the enabling of a comprehensive control over government activities by 
the National Treasury. This occurred in line with the priorities of fiscal restraint. Rather than 
a developmental engine the democratic South African state became one whose primary 
concern was controlling costs, a phenomenon which Segatti and Pons-Vignon describe as 
‘technocratic capture’.207 
Over the two decades of democracy this narrow neoliberal approach has served to 
consolidate the strength of big conglomerates within the context of the Minerals and Energy 
Complex, which has served as the core of capitalist development in South Africa. Under the 
continued dominance of the Mineral and Energy Complex, patterns of accumulation have 
followed the global trend of increased financialisation. This has led to high rates of capital 
flight due to the relaxation of exchange controls required by the convergence with 
macroeconomic orthodoxy. Increased financialisation has served as the bedrock of MEC 
centred accumulation and consequently has further reinforced the instances of 
unemployment and inequality within a context of a large and profitable financial sector.208 
Another key consequence of the neoliberal character of democratic South Africa has been 
the reductionist approach towards tackling the poverty crisis. Within the neoliberal logic, 
poverty is deemed to be indicative of poverty being the result of lack i.e. people are poor 
because they lack something. What this conception of poverty misses is the structural 
nature of poverty and how the macroeconomic context and processes can constrain the 
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prospects of poor people in terms of access to job opportunities and infrastructure. 
Attempts at poverty alleviation have occurred through large spending on social programmes 
in the form of interventions such as conditional cash transfers and housing. However, these 
attempts have taken place within a restricted fiscal context and a context which has 
prioritised private provision of services to the poor, consequently this has not done much in 
terms of reducing inequality.209 According to the Goldman Sachs report “Two decades of 
Democracy”, 85% of the black African demographic remains poverty stricken, whilst 87% of 
their white counterparts are in the middle to upper classes. Fifteen million South Africans 
continue to live below the absolute poverty line of two dollars per day.210 
TRANSFORMATION & CLASS CONSOLIDATION: BLACK ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT (BEE) 
With a continuously ailing economic outlook, the ANC government sought to find avenues 
which it believed would drive the GEAR strategy and even out the crippling racialised 
economic inequality by including the previously excluded black majority in mainstream 
economic participation. A tool identified towards this end emerged in the conception of 
Black Economic Empowerment (BEE). 211 
At its initial stages under the Mandela administration, BEE activity undertook to purchase 
equity in established target companies, utilising Special Purpose Vehicles (SPV’s), which 
utilised shares as collateral against the loans which had been obtained.212  Despite initial 
financial structuring difficulties experienced by the early phases of BEE213, BEE saw the 
incorporation of a small number of prominent black politically connected business leaders 
into the highest echelons of the economic elite. BEE would rely on corporate social 
responsibility through the adoption of voluntary codes, charters and other agreements.214  
This translated into the slow transformation towards black business ownership which was 
even noted by the government itself. As a response to this slow transformation, the Mbeki 
led government decided to adopt Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment which would 
aim to expand and thus improve black business participation. However, this has, as Klug 
illustrates: “primarily served as a key driver of corporate merger and acquisition activity, 
which, according to a Moody’s rating agency report, accounted for R200-billion worth of 
business transactions.”215 The effects of such boardroom success have not translated in to 
economic inclusivity of the majority, as BEE remains the subject of much criticism and ire.  
                                                          
209
 A Segatti and Pons Vignon N, The Art of Neoliberalism, 
210
 Goldman Sachs, Two Decades of Freedom, 24-30. 
211
 “South Africa’s Economic Transformation: A strategy for Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment”, 12.  
212
 Anthony Butler: Black Economic Empowerment Since 1994:Diverse hopes and differentially fulfilled 
aspirations, http://www.yale.edu/macmillan/apartheid/butlerp2.pdf    
213
 H Klug, The Constitution of South Africa a Contextual Analysis, (Hart publishing, Oxford-Portland-Oregon 
2010), General editors Peter Leyland and Andrew Harding; Associate editors, Benjamin Berger and Alexander 
Fischer (Constitutional Systems of the World). 
214
 H Klug, The Constitution of South Africa a Contextual Analysis, 290  
215
 H Klug, The Constitution of South Africa a Contextual Analysis,  
56 | P a g e  
 
Many scholars and observers have remained critical about the BEE project. In this regard, 
McKinley observes that the Thabo Mbeki administration has assumed that the black 
bourgeoisie “will be more patriotic and will, in turn positively affect white capital to be the 
same, not only in relation to internal productive ‘investment’ but also in direct relation to 
the position of workers and the poor, (‘we are one mantra’)”.216 This simply did not 
materialise.    
South African author, businessman and political commentator Moeletsi Mbeki decries BEE 
as an elite pact as which was aimed at maintaining the status quo of inequality and not 
really a means to ensure majority black participation in mainstream economic activity in 
South Africa.  In this regard, Mbeki argues that:  
“The conglomerates took their marginal assets, and gave them to politically 
influential black people, with the purpose in my view, not to transform the economy 
but to create a black political class that is in alliance with the conglomerates and 
therefore wants to maintain the status quo of our economy and the way in which it 
operates”.217  
What seems to have been identified as a crucial vehicle, to drive the vision encompassed by 
GEAR, ASGISA and the NGP has not delivered the desired results. The implementation of 
Black Economic Empowerment policies has been plagued by difficulties. Further, the overall 
impact remains quite limited.218  
SOCIAL DECLINE AND THE NDP 
Increased instances of violent crime and social unrest have become a common feature of 
the democratic South African landscape.  The inability of the democratic State to deliver 
services to the vulnerable sectors of the population in South Africa has culminated in a loss 
of confidence, in engagement through democratic processes by those affected. Therefore 
the increasing instances of violent protest and general unrest are emblematic of this erosion 
of confidence in the democratic state.219   
Democratic South Africa is reported to have 300 incidents of protest action per year, and 
increasingly this protest action has assumed a violent nature, violence both by the 
protesters and increasingly the state.220 To this end Ebrahim Fakir -a prominent political 
                                                          
216
 Dale T. McKinley, “Capitalism with a Black Face: BEE and the ANC”, (Presentation to ILRIG Conference on: 
“SA Today: How do we characterise the Social Formation’? Cape Town -29 April 2011) 
217
 Moeletsi Mbeki , “Wealth Creation: Only a matter of time before the hand grenade explodes” Business Day, 
October 28  2012,  http://www.businessday.co.za/articles/content.aspx?id=133902  
218
 R Dunnigan , “F Fazaeli, J Spies, Black Economic Empowerment-difficulties and opportunities in making right 
the wrongs of the past”, http://faculty-course.insead.edu/dutt/emdc/projects/Sep-Oct05/Group_D.pdf  
219
 Thiven Reddy, “ANC Decline, Social Mobilisation and Political Society: Understanding South Africa’s Evolving 
Political Culture”, “Politkon, December 2010, 37,2-3), 185-206. 
 
220
 Ebrahim Fakir, “Protests are a cry for political recognition”. Mail & Guardian, August 29, 2014, 
http://mg.co.za/article/2014-08-29-protests-are-a-cry-for-political-recognition 
57 | P a g e  
 
analyst in South Africa- suggests that “violent protest seems to be the only way in which 
people feel they are recognised and heard”.221 Research conducted by the University of 
Johannesburg indicates that protests increased to 407 incidents in 2012; however this 
number dropped to 287 in 2013.  
The interviews conducted by this research revealed that amongst the main reasons for 
protest action were the high levels of unemployment amongst young people. What were 
also revealed by this study were the increased instances of state violence against protesters. 
Between 2004 and 2014, 43 protestors were killed by police. This figure excludes the 34 
miners who were killed by police on the Platinum belt in Marikana in 2012, when they 
resorted to protest as means to highlight their precarious working conditions.222  
In November 2011 the ANC led government, under the leadership of Jacob Zuma revealed 
its blue print through which it would attempt to address the country’s persisting challenges. 
The National Development Plan (NDP) was released and it would also encompass the 
democratic state’s vision until 2030. Like its predecessors, the NDP adequately identifies the 
challenges afflicting the post-1994 political economy namely: sluggish growth, increasing 
unemployment, inequality, poverty and social unrest in South Africa.  
Whilst evaluating the performance of the NDP would be somewhat of a premature 
endeavour. Given its fairly recent release and long-term projections, its broad 
pronouncements do not bode well for the prospects of chartering an alternative and 
developmental economic path. In this regard, the NDP reaffirms a commitment to the New 
Growth Path “with regard to current government policies and programmes, the New 
Growth Path is government’s key programme to take the country onto a higher growth 
trajectory”.223 The NDP seems to hinges its vision on the same neoliberal macroeconomic 
orthodox orientation that is premised on a limited or restrictive fiscal stance which informs 
the NGP as highlighted earlier in this research. This research draws the conclusion that there 
has been no conclusive deviation from the macroeconomic path chartered by GEAR; 
therefore, it remains to be seen as to whether or not the NDP will successfully address the 
persisting challenges of poverty, unemployment and inequality.      
CONCLUSION: 
This chapter has attempted to illustrate the neoliberal instance which has characterised the 
post-94 democratic South African political economy, as well as its consequences in terms of 
addressing the country’s persistent challenges of poverty, unemployment and inequality. 
Despite registering key gains, GEAR failed to deliver its projected economic growth rate; 
consequently it failed to address poverty, unemployment and inequality which 
demonstrated an increase under GEAR. Under GEAR the South African economy also 
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experienced rapid and aggressive liberalisation which exposed it to the external shocks of 
the global capital markets, massive capital flight due to the relaxation of exchange controls 
and rapid privatisation.  
Recognising the political economic malaise the South African government championed what 
it deemed as alternative macroeconomic frameworks in ASGISA and the New Growth Path 
respectively, in an attempt to arrest the economic decline. However, these new frameworks 
did not deviate conclusively from their GEAR predecessors and only sought to reproduce 
and reinforce the instances of unemployment and imbalance between labour and capital 
while poverty and inequality continued to rise. These new frameworks relied on the same 
restrictive orthodox macroeconomic principles as GEAR which was premised on fiscal 
prudence and inflation targeting to maintain stability, whilst this was necessary it proved 
insufficient.  
Contrary to neoclassical interpretations of the role of the state under neoliberalism the 
democratic South African State proved to be strong and efficient agent in consolidating 
neoliberalism despite extensive social spending in direct cash transfers and in housing, this 
spending framework was pursued within the strict confines of fiscal restraint. The plight of 
the majority who had been historically marginalised by Apartheid’s laws of racial continued 
to worsen, bringing about a rise in protest action and instances of public violence, signalling 
the erosion in the confidence of the democratic state to deliver. The State’s response to this 
became heavy handed as instances of police violence on citizens grew and reached their 
zenith on the platinum belt in 2012 where 34 miners were shot and killed by police.  
In November 2011 the government released its blue print long-term vision for democratic 
South Africa in the NDP. Whilst the performance of the NDP remains to be seen, it’s 
affirmation of the New Growth Path as one of its key drivers is disconcerting as this is 
indicative of a continuation of the same macroeconomic orthodox practices. It is against this 
backdrop which this research concludes that it is unlikely that the NDP will successfully 
reverse the challenges of poverty, unemployment and inequality and enable the South 
African economy to achieve the requisite growth rate.  
59 | P a g e  
 
CHAPTER SIX:  
CONCLUSION 
The conclusion will offer a final analysis of what has been argued throughout this study. It 
has been this study’s contention that Post-Apartheid South Africa’s economic planning and 
performance has been influenced by neoliberalism. In this regard the focus of this study was 
aimed at critically assessing the adoption of the Growth Employment And Redistribution 
(GEAR) macroeconomic strategy by the ANC led government. Therefore it has been argued 
that the adoption of GEAR was a key defining moment in democratic South Africa’s 
economic trajectory. Thus, the adoption of GEAR signified and solidified democratic South 
Africa’s alignment with the dominant global neoliberal paradigm which had come to 
characterise the post-cold war global political economy.  Moreover, the decision to adopt 
the GEAR strategy was a deliberate one by the elite decision makers in the ANC led 
government. This is particularly crucial to note when one considers that the ANC’s historical 
vision for an economically transformed democratic South Africa differed considerably from 
the proposals and assumptions made by the GEAR strategy. The ANC’s historical vision 
premised on the ideals of the freedom charter, envisaged that growth would be pursued 
primarily through redistribution and this would be an initiative championed by the 
democratic state. This vision was summarily abandoned as democratic South African 
economic planning assumed an ostensibly neoliberal trajectory.  
In the first chapter, the study sought to outline the conceptual premises of neoliberal 
thinking and practice. It is argued in this chapter that neoliberalism derives its conceptual 
assumptions from classical liberal theory, which holds to orthodox economic assumptions 
propagated by classical scholars such as Adam Smith. The orthodox economic view advances 
the idea that economic interactions are best maximised when they are unencumbered; and 
this is realised in the context of a free market. The chapter highlights the uncritical 
acceptance of the ideas of the free market and illustrates the limitations of the free market 
and suggests that the free market in actual fact does not exist. Economic interactions are 
bound by and governed by rules and these are adhered to or resisted subjectively. Further, 
the pursuit of a free market is incompatible with the complexities of the social realities 
which characterise human life which cannot be separated from and subordinated to purist 
notions of the economy. 
The second chapter proceeds to trace the political and historical emergence of 
neoliberalism, this is done through a historical description of how neoliberalism emerged as 
the dominant post -cold war political economic paradigm. It also contextualises South 
Africa’s experience of neoliberalism by tracing the emergence of neoliberal discourse in the 
South African context and giving backing background to South Africa’s democratic 
transition. Neoliberalism supplanted what was known as the “Golden age of social 
democratic capitalism” or embedded liberalism; this period saw unprecedented levels of 
capital accumulation, economic growth and high living standards.  
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This affirmed the notion that development and stability were most desired with the 
assurance of the state sponsorship, which sought to ensure the realisation of full 
employment, growth and the general welfare of citizens. Following a capital crisis in the mid 
to late 1970s the capitalist system was afflicted by slow growth and high inflation, a 
phenomenon otherwise known as stagflation thus resulting in a crisis for capital 
accumulation. In a bid to restore the fortunes of capital key historical proponents of 
neoliberalism emerged in England and America in the 1980s, in the mould of Margret 
Thatcher and Ronald Raegan respectively, who sought to rectify the global economic 
system.  
Their efforts resulted in the adoption of restrictive policy measures which would prioritise 
the needs of private capital at the expense of development and citizen welfare. Emphasis 
was placed on the deregulation of markets, extensive market liberalisation, foreign direct 
investment and the rapid integration of the global economy.  This formula registered a 
devastating social impact which saw the loss of jobs and declining social indicators on the 
one hand and the enrichment of an elite minority. It was replicated in developing market 
context such as Africa; guaranteed by the International Financial Institutions such as the 
World Banks and International Monetary Fund (IMF) and resulted high levels of poverty, 
inequality and unemployment. The dominance of or primacy of markets had become 
entrenched in the global political-economic order as it were.  
This period coincided with the end of the Cold War and the ultimate collapse of communism 
as a contending ideological and political force, thus the global economy was subsumed by 
neoliberal ideas. It was against this backdrop that South Africa made its transition to 
democracy. What was crucial to note is that the collapse of communism meant that the ANC 
which would emerge as South Africa’s first democratic governance had lost an ideological 
ally in the USSR.  Hitherto, the ANC had pegged its economic ideas for transforming South 
African society on socialist ideas once espoused by the communist Soviet Union. Despite 
this reality, the economic path embarked upon by the ANC when in government would not 
be a given.  
Neoliberal discourse in South Africa had begun in the late 1980s with the National Party 
government, which was responding to the capital crisis which had afflicted South Africa due 
to international isolation and divestment measures in protest against its racially 
exclusionary policies.  The National Party sought to restore the fortunes of capital by 
proposing neoliberal measures which were largely pro-business, in its Normative Economic 
Model document. Therefore neoliberal discourse in a democratic South Africa would not be 
a new phenomenon without historical basis. This background would somewhat set the 
scene for South Africa’s convergence with neoliberalism.  
In chapter three a historical description of how the ANC ultimately embraced neoliberalism 
is given, this despite its historical commitment to ideas that were antithetical to neoliberal 
assumptions which prioritised the dominance of markets. In this regard the ANC had 
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articulated its commitment to the ideals of the Freedom Charter which envisaged that a 
transformed post-apartheid South Africa would premise its economic policy orientation on 
the prioritisation of redistribution as a means to attain growth, thus placing emphasis on 
attaining the needs of the people. This would be a state led project and was spelled out 
more clearly in the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) base document. 
Upon its ascendance to government the ANC government’s economic policy would be the 
site of vociferous contestation, drawing the attention of competing interests stemming from 
both domestic and international business as well as International Financial institutions such 
as the IMF and World Bank. These protagonists would spare no effort in persuading the ANC 
that pro-market neoliberal policies were the best for a democratic South Africa. 
Consequently the ANC was bombarded by an onslaught of advocacy and scenario planning 
initiatives which agitated for the adoption of a market led strategy, towards the realisation 
of its transformation aims. Key leaders in the ANC government who were viewed as being 
more amenable towards pro market policies were also targeted for persuasion by business 
interests.  
Counter arguments and perspectives were presented by the ANC’s allies in the Congress of 
South Africa Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP) which 
were in keeping with a more developmental economic strategy. These efforts produced the 
MERG document as well as the RDP base document which held to the proposals of state led 
redistribution as a means to achieve growth. Despite these efforts, the ANC ultimately 
began to embrace a market led strategy, this culminated in the adoption of the Growth 
Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) Strategy which was predominantly neoliberal in its 
orientation. The GEAR strategy emphasised fiscal discipline, the deregulation of markets, 
and the aggressive lifting of exchange controls which facilitated South Africa’s reintegration 
into the global economy, a terrain which would prove unfavourable for. This reflected the 
strength and dominance of South Africa’s business establishment against whom the ANC’s 
resolve to pursue a more developmental orientation was severely constrained. It also 
reflected the willingness by key decision makers in the ANC government to accept neoliberal 
market led proposals as a means through which transformation could be achieved.  Despite 
the shift to a pro market orientation economically; politically the GEAR strategy was 
positioned and packaged as a means towards driving the RDP programme. It is argued that 
the adoption of GEAR proved to be a key defining moment in post-apartheid South Africa’s 
political economic trajectory, which has followed a neoliberal market led orientation as it is 
illustrated in Chapter four.  
Chapter four illustrates the GEAR strategy’s failure to achieve the economic goals that it had 
set for transformation. During the period in which GEAR was implemented, it yielded slow 
economic growth, registered declining social indicators which saw an increase in poverty 
levels, rising levels of inequality and unemployment. In recognising the failures of GEAR, the 
ANC government under Thabo Mbeki’s leadership sought alternative economic strategies 
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and began to champion the idea of developmental state that would be more interventionist. 
This resulted in a policy shift and in 2005, the Accelerated Shared Growth Initiative (ASGISA) 
was unveiled which sought to chart new macroeconomic policy direction. However, the 
ASGISA framework did not deviate from the assumptions made by GEAR which emphasised 
fiscal prudence in keeping with neoliberal leanings. Poverty levels remained stubbornly high, 
inequality and unemployment continued to demonstrate an increasing trend.   
This prompted the unveiling of a new policy initiative was tabled in the of the New Growth 
Path (NEGP) framework in 2009. This would inform the ANC government’s strategy in the 
stalling pursuit for transformation.  The NEGP also held steadfast to the neoliberal 
assumptions which privileged market led growth, despite the government recognition of the 
shortcomings in achieving the desired economic growth results and improvement of social 
indicators. In this respect post-apartheid economic policy demonstrated continuity in 
neoliberal market led reform and thus entrenching the historical tension between the 
market and development. In 2010 the ANC government undertook an extensive diagnostic 
initiative which culminated in the appointment of the National Policy Commission which 
sought to craft a new way forward. In 2011 The National Development Plan was revealed, 
this would be a comprehensive blue print that will inform government strategy in all 
spheres of governance. From an economic perspective it affirmed the NEGP as a framework 
for achieving transformation, it remains to be seen if the NDP will yield the desired 
transformation results. 
South Africa’s brand of neoliberalism reflected unique characteristics, whereas neoliberal 
prescriptions dictate a minimal state whose involvement is limited to ensure fairness in the 
market, this was not the case in democratic South Africa. The post-apartheid South African 
State proved to be instrumental in deepening the economic neoliberal orientation. It 
established key ‘super’ departments in the National Treasury (NT) and South African 
Revenue Services (SARS) which held in place the orthodox policy orientation under the guise 
of the New Public Management (NPM) framework which restricted room for developmental 
policy proposals. In the same token the South African State presided over an extensive 
social welfare regime which was anchored by programmes that rolled out social grants of 
varying categories and public housing. This served as political means to assuage the growing 
frustrations from citizens.  
In continued attempts to effect policy instruments that would realise that transformative 
agenda of the Freedom Charter and RDP, the ANC government unveiled Black Economic 
Empowerment (BEE). BEE would be a legislative regime that sought to create economic 
parity between the black majority and white minority holders of economic power, through 
the purchase of equity stakes for black entrepreneurs in white owned companies. The 
shortcomings of BEE legislation lay in that they privileged politically connected elite and 
didn’t broaden the base for meaningful black majority economic participation. This served 
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to consolidate the convergence between the old capitalist class and the new black capitalist 
class created by BEE legislation.  
The aggregate result of the difficulties in achieving transformation in democratic South 
Africa was evidenced by continued social decline.  The majority of citizens began to take to 
the streets in protest to demonstrate their frustrations at the government’s lack of delivery 
to the vulnerable sections of the population. This reflected erosion in the public’s 
confidence in the democratic state and its processes as the instances of public violence 
around policy issues demonstrated a dramatic increase. The adoption of GEAR in 1996 
placed severe constraints on the ANC government’s ability to realise its transformative 
freedom charter and RDP vision which envisaged a state led redistribution programme 
which would emphasise taking care of the needs of the people whilst achieving growth. The 
ANC government has pinned its strategy on the National Development Plan and has 
undertaken to vociferously implement the National Development Plan. Whilst the 
implementation of the NDP continues it seem unlikely that it will result in a policy rupture or 
a substantive shift deviating from the market led neoliberal economic orientation put in 
place by the adoption of GEAR.  
At the core of this study an analysis of the reasons that the ANC unilaterally adopted the 
Growth Employment and Redistribution Strategy is offered. This analysis sought to draw 
attention to the complex and often challenging terrain of post-Cold War political economic 
governance in the developing world which characterise the context within in which the ANC 
ascended to governance. Whilst a critique of the ANC’s acceptance of the propositions of 
neoliberal reform has been advanced, in that key ANC decision makers became willing 
participants in prioritising orthodox economic policies and did so somewhat zealously. It was 
also acknowledged that the ANC had to contend with the somewhat overwhelming strength 
of established domestic and international capitalist interests, as it was indicated in the third 
chapter.  
Therefore, the suggestion being made is that additional constraints were placed on the 
ANC’s already underdeveloped economic policy making capacity after transition which was 
alluded to in the thesis. As a consequence, the ANC wasn’t ability to follow through on its 
vision to implement a political economic approach which prioritised state led redistribution 
to address people’s basic needs as a means to facilitate growth. This was a vision derived 
from the Freedom Charter and subsequently the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme base document.  
Reference was also made to suggest that a significant degree of state intervention in South 
Africa was more desirable. This would serve as a means to attain the economic conditions 
which would reverse the structural legacy of the racial exclusion of the majority of South 
Africans from meaningful participation in the political economy. Historically, this paradigm 
has been realised in the form of a developmental state, whilst it is a preferred approach, it is 
not without its limitations.  For instance, there could be institutional constraints on state 
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intervention where there is limited budgetary capability due to a low income tax base, in 
effect curtailing the state’s ability to adequately finance its budget deficit. In other 
instances; states experience limited monetary policy capability.224  
Asian states commonly referred to as the Newly Industrialised Countries (NICS) are also 
often cited as examples of the success of increased state intervention.225 Even in this 
instance, it should be acknowledged that certain special dispensations were available to 
these states from which they benefited. These included: their strategic importance in the 
cold-war which resulted in economic and military aid from America as well as exemption 
from pressures to conform to the demands of market liberalisation.226  
This is to emphasise the constrained and often inconsistent character of the policy making 
environment which characterised the post-cold war global economy, in which such 
dispensations no longer exist, especially for developing countries like South Africa. 
Ultimately, developing contexts such as South Africa might be better served by transcending 
the market versus state dichotomy which can be said to be ahistorical and misleading; and 
in so doing, find the appropriate balance between state and market intervention.227 This 
may very well be a better proposition for the realisation of transformation agenda that 
would be measured against the eradication of poverty, unemployment and inequality, 
characteristics that continue to bedevil democratic South Africa’s political and economic 
landscape.  
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